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PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION AND
SECTION 1983: WHEN HAS CONGRESS "BY
IMPLICATION NEGATED" JURISDICTION?
I. Introduction
Plaintiffs suing today under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code' face an uncertainty in the law that needlessly curtails
their access to federal court.2 In a typical case, Plaintiff has brought
a section 1983 action against an Employee who, while acting under
color of state law,3 has allegedly deprived Plaintiff of his consti-
tutional rights. The Employee is judgment proof;5 Plaintiff therefore
decides to sue the Employee's Employer as well, under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. 6 But, because of certain restrictions on section
1983 actions,7 Plaintiff cannot sue the Employer directly under section
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
For a discussion of the historical origins and current use' of § 1983, see infra
notes 45-107 and accompanying text. For: an excellent summary of § 1983 actions,
see 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
2d §§ 3573-3573.2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
2. See infra notes 13-27, 234-81 and accompanying text.
3. As one of the elements of a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must prove that
the person who deprived him of constitutional rights was acting under color of
state law. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the mean-
ing of the term "under color of state law," see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying
text.
4. Deprivation of constitutional rights is one of the elements of a § 1983
action. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
5. The term "judgment proof" describes "all persons against whom judgments
for money recoveries are of no effect; e.g., persons who are insolvent .... " BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 759 (5th ed. 1979).
6. Respondeat superior is a form of vicarious or imputed liability. See W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON -THE LAW OF TORTS 499 (5th ed:
1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Under this doctrine, "a master is liable in cer-
tain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979). Specifically, the master is liable only
when the servant has acted within the scope of his employment. See PROSSER, supra
at 502.
liability. See infra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
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1983. Plaintiff therefore sues the Employer under state law.8
Normally, Plaintiff would have to bring this state-law claim9 in
the state courts. 0 Under the doctrine known as pendent party ju-
risdiction," however, a plaintiff bringing a federal claim in federal
court can also bring a state-law claim in federal court against an
entirely new party, if the state-law claim is sufficiently related to
the federal claim.' 2 Thus, Plaintiff could use pendent party juris-
diction to append his state-law claim against the Employer to his
section 1983 claim against the Employee.
Tremendous uncertainty, however, surrounds the doctrine of pen-
dent party jurisdiction."' The doctrine originally developed in the
8. For examples of cases in which plaintiffs have used state-law respondeat
superior claims against municipalities to substitute for § 1983 claims, see infra
note 106.
9. As used in this Note, "nonfederal" or "state-law" refers to a claim that,
considered independently, falls outside the scope of jurisdiction granted by article
Ill, section 2 of the United States Constitution. A "federal" claim is one that
falls within this scope. For a discussion of article Ill limitations on federal court
jurisdiction, see infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
11. "Pendent party jurisdiction" has been defined as the doctrine that allows
a party "who has asserted a federal claim against one party over which there is
jurisdiction, . . . to join an entirely different party on the basis of a state-law
claim over which there is no independent basis of federal jurisdiction." Cheltenham
Supply Corp. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 n.3 (E.D. Pa.
1982). It is distinct from pendent jurisdiction, which allows a party to join a
state-law claim against the same party against which it has federal claims. See id.
For a discussion of pendent party jurisdiction, see infra notes 194-233 and accom-
panying text.
12. See supra note 11, infra notes 181-202 and accompanying text. Other limita-
tions on the use of pendent party jurisdiction are discussed below. See infra notes
215-20 and accompanying text.
13. The confusion has been noted by both the courts, see e.g., Grimes v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1977) (Aldinger "makes it
difficult to determine" when to allow pendent party jurisdiction); Fritts v. Niehouse,
604 F. Supp. 823, 828-30 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (courts in need of guidance), aff'd,
774 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1985), and the commentators. See, e.g., Bagwell, Federal
Pendent Party Jurisdiction and Pendency in Diversity Cases, 38 ALA. LAW. 333,
333 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bagwell]; Note, Unravelling the "Pendent Party"
Controversy: A Revisionist Approach to Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 64 B.U.L.
REV. 895, 922-23 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Unravelling]; Comment, Aldinger v.
Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 142 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Pendent Jurisdiction]; Comment, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdic-
tion: Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YAE L.J. 627, 647 n. 112 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Law-Tied Jurisdiction]; Redish, Book Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1378,
1398 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Redish]; Capra, Pendent Parties, Pendent Claims:
A Solution to the Gordian Knot, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 4, 1982, at 22, cols. 1-2 [hereinafter
cited as Capra].
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lower federal courts 4 and has never received explicit approval from
the Supreme Court.'5 As a result, many courts and some commen-
tators have questioned its validity.' 6 Additional confusion has been
caused by the nature of the few Supreme Court decisions that have
addressed the issue of pendent party jurisdiction.' 7 In the first of
these decisions, Aldinger v. Howard,8 the Court articulated a test
to determine whether a particular use of pendent party jurisdiction
was proper. This "Aldinger test" essentially requires a federal court
to examine congressional intent: before exercising pendent party
jurisdiction, a federal court must "satisfy itself ... that Congress
in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by im-
plication negated [the] existence" of such jurisdiction. 19
This test, according to many courts and legal scholars, is both
vague2" and illogical,2 ' and gives the lower federal courts little
guidance as to exactly what kind of congressional activity will con-
stitute the express or implied "negation" in question.2 2 Later Supreme
14. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 203-33 and accompanying text. See also Onesti v. Thomson
McKinnon Secs., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (N.D. I1. 1985); Knudsen v. D.C.B.,
Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (N.D. Il1. 1984); Bostedt v. Festivals, Inc., 569 F.
Supp. 503, 505 (N.D. Il. 1983).
16. See, e.g., Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Bright v. City of New York, No. 83 Civ. 7775-
CSH (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1985) (available Jan. 1, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file); Pirrone v. North Hotel Assocs., 108 F.R.D. 78, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
17. See infra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
18. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Aldinger,
see infra notes 208-25 and accompanying text.
19. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. For a discussion of the analysis the federal courts
should use to ascertain whether Congress has "negated" jurisdiction, see infra notes
282-362 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Fritts v. Niehouse, 604 F. Supp. 823, 828 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
("extremely vague standard"), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1985); Bagwell, supra
note 13, at 344 (1977) ("exceptionally dull tool"); Matasar, Rediscovering "One
Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAUF. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (1983) ("vague") [here-
inafter cited as Matasar, Rediscovering]; Unravelling, supra note 13, at 904 ("loose
standard"); Pendent Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 142 ("considerable uncertainty"
in idea of implied negation).
21. See, e.g., Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the Policies
of Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 IND. L.J. 211, 214 (1982) ("un-
convincing rationale") [hereinafter cited as Luneburg]; Redish, supra note 13, at 1396
(Aldinger opinion "disregards logic").
22. See, e.g., Fritts, 604 F. Supp. at 828; Bagwell, supra note 13, at 333;
Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and Limits of
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C.D. L. REV. 103, 167 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Matasar, Primer]; Unravelling, supra note 13, at 913; Pendent Jurisdiction,
supra note 13, at 142; Redish, supra note 13, at 1396-98; Capra, supra note 13,
at 22, col. 3.
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Court opinions have failed to provide clarification. 3 As a result, in
the ten years since Aldinger, the lower federal courts have been left
in a state of confusion and dissension over how to apply the test.
2 4
Because Aldinger itself was a section 1983 case, 5 the confusion
surrounding its test had a particularly strong impact on section 1983
cases. Some courts have flatly held that pendent party jurisdiction
is never available in a section 1983 case.2 6 Others, citing to a perceived
hostility toward the doctrine on the part of the Supreme Court,
have taken an extremely conservative approach to the doctrine.2 7
This Note maintains that such courts have interpreted the Aldinger
test in a far more restrictive and unanalytic way than the Supreme
23. See infra notes 230-81 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this
Note, the Court's only significant post-AIdinger opinion on pendent party jurisdiction
is Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), which is discussed
below. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text. In addition, one might
consider the brief dissenting opinion by Justice Rehnquist in Symm v. United States,
439 U.S. 1105 (1979), which is also discussed below. See infra note 349. Neither
opinion has provided any additional guidance to the lower federal courts. See
Unravelling, supra note 13, at 913, 922; Capra, supra note 13, at 24, col. 3 n.18.
Other important decisions are Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984) ("neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction
may override the eleventh amendment['s]" bar on federal court suits against the
states) and Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 251 (1985)
(ancillary jurisdiction cannot override eleventh amendment). Because of these de-
cisions, this Note considers only suits against municipal defendants, who generally
receive no protection from the eleventh amendment. See Infra note 79 and accompany-
ing text.
24. See, e.g., Unravelling, supra note 13, at 913 ("courts have reached divergent
conclusions about the propriety" of pendent party jurisdiction and "have rested
their decisions on inconsistent and often confusing doctrinal approaches"). For a
discussion of the variety of positions the federal courts have taken in the wake
of Aldinger and Owen, see infra notes 234-81 and accompanying text.
25. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 3-4.
26. See, e.g., Finch v. Mississippi State Medical Ass'n, 585 F.2d 763, 780
(5th Cir. 1978); McArthur v. Robinson, 568 F. Supp. 393, 397 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
27. See, e.g., Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 1977) (Aldinger sent
a negative signal; dismisses); Onesti v. Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc., 619 F.
Supp. 1262, 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Supreme Court "has never expressly acknowleged
the legitimacy" of doctrine; thus doctrine "is construed conservatively"); Fritts v.
Niehouse, 604 F. Supp. 823, 828 n.9 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (Aldinger is "an expression
of general disfavor for pendent party jurisdiction"; dismisses), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1170
(8th Cir. 1985); Knudsen v. D.C.B., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (N.D. Il1. 1984);
(doctrine was "negatively referred to in Aldinger"; dismisses);, Chas. Kurz Co. v.
Lombardi, 595 F. Supp. 373, 378, 381 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (reading Aldinger "as a
whole," concludes "the strong presumption must be against exercising pendent
party jurisdiction"; dismisses); Bostedt v. Festivals, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 503, 505
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (Supreme Court "has never expressly approved of pendent party
jurisdiction. In fact, the opposite is likely true"; dismisses); Red Elk v. Vig, 571
F. Supp. 422, 426 (D.S.D. 1983) (Aldinger "rejected the concept"; dismisses).
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Court intended.28 As background, Part II of the Note will discuss
the history and current use of section 1983,29 as well as tracing the
history of the three doctrines-ancillary jurisdiction,m pendent ju-
risdiction3' and pendent party jurisdiction3 2-under which the federal
courts have traditionally exercised supplemental jurisdiction" over
nonfederal claims. Part III will delineate the contours of the current
dispute over the validity of pendent party jurisdiction, focusing
particularly on section 1983 cases.34  Part IV will reexamine the
Aldinger test, and will describe the analysis a federal court must
employ to determine if Congress has "expressly or by implication
negated" jurisdiction."
The Note concludes that the Court intended the federal courts,
on a case-by-case basis, to engage in traditional methods of statutory
construction,3 6 and that, in order to establish "negation," the federal
courts must find some affirmative congressional activity, beyond
mere silence or a failure to include a category of parties, by which
Congress has manifested its purpose to exclude such parties." In
other words, Aldinger always permits pendent party jurisdiction
unless Congress has acted affirmatively to negate it. 3s Finally, in
Part V, the Note applies the Aldinger test to two kinds of cases that
arise frequently.3 9 In the first, the pendent party is a private person
or corporation that has not acted under color of state law;40 in the
second, the pendent party is a municipality that has been sued under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.'
28. See infra notes 282-362 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 42-107 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 126-55 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 156-93 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 194-233 and accompanying text.
33. The term "supplemental jurisdiction" was coined by Richard Matasar. See
Matasar, Rediscovering, supra note 20, at 1402 n.3; Matasar, Primer, supra note
22 at 104 n.3. The term refers collectively to ancillary, pendent, and pendent party
jurisdiction. See Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 104 & n.3, 167. Other com-
mentators have used the term "incidental jurisdiction." See, e.g., Note, A Closer
Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Ju-
risdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935, 1935 (1982) [hereinafter cited as A Closer
Look]; Unravelling, supra note 13, at 898.
34. See infra notes 234-81 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 282-362 and accompanying text.
36. See Infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
37. See Infra notes 289-349 and accompanying text.
38. See id.
39. See infra notes 363-427 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 366-401 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 402-27 and accompanying text.
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II. Background Information: Section 1983, Federal Jurisdiction
and Doctrines of Supplemental Jurisdiction
To apply the Aldinger test, a federal court must first consider
the origins of the statute at issue and the parameters of federal
jurisdiction. In this connection, this Part will discuss: (1) section
1983, focusing primarily on the available evidence of congressional
intent with regard to providing a federal forum and allowing mu-
nicipalities to be sued in federal court;42 (2) the limits on federal
court jurisdiction; 43 and (3) the three doctrines-ancillary, pendent
and pendent party jurisdiction-that permit expansion of federal
jurisdiction."
A. Section 1983 Actions
As background to later discussion of pendent party jurisdiction
in a section 1983 action, this Section presents the essential elements
of section 1983,'4 before discussing the origins of the statute and
the evidence of congressional intent." This Section seeks to establish
that: (1) a primary motivation behind section 1983's enactment was
to create a federal forum;" and (2) the idea of federal suits against
municipalities was not repugnant to the enacting Congress. 48
1. Current "Practice Under Section 1983
In essence, section 198349 creates a remedy for the deprivation of
constitutional rights by a person who acts "under color of" state
law.50 The action thus requires proof of two elements.5 First, a
plaintiff must show that he was deprived of "rights, privileges, or
immunities ' 52 granted by the Constitution or the laws of the United
States." Second, he must show that the person who deprived him
42. See infra notes 45-107 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 121-233 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 82-107 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). For the text of § 1983, see supra note 1.
50. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982); 13B WRIGHT,
supra note 1, § 3573.2, at 203; see also I C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
§ 56 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ANTIEAU].
51. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); 13B WRIGHT,
supra note 1, § 3573.2, at 203.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
53. 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3573.2, at 203.
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of his rights was acting under color of state law.54 Generally, a
defendant is acting under color of state law if he is an officer
or employee of the state and deprives the plaintiff of his rights,
either while serving the state or by acting under the authority of
his position." Even if he abuses his power or exceeds his authority,
he has still acted under color of state law.5 6
In addition, private parties may be acting under color of state
law if they act jointly with the state or a state official in such a
way that they "may be appropriately characterized as 'state ac-
tors.' "" Thus, if the private party enters into a conspiracy with a
state agent, he may be held liable under section 1983.11
Section 1343(3) of Title 28 of the United States Code 9 grants
subject matter jurisdiction 6 to the federal courts over section 1983
claims. 6' As discussed below, 62 Congress originally conceived of sec-
tion 1983 as a "uniquely federal remedy,' 63 through which a private
person could find protection in federal court from actions of the
state or its officials that deprived him of his federal rights. 64 Despite
this original purpose, the Court has held that state courts also have
54. Id.
55. See 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 50, § 57, at 103-04.
56. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961), overruled on other grounds,
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see I ANTIEAU,
supra note 50, § 57, at 104; 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3573.1, at 199-200.
57. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939; see 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 50, § 59, at 109; 13B
WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3573.2, at 210-11.
58. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 174 n.44 (1970); see I
ANTIEAU, supra note 50, § 60, at 111; 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3573.2, at
211. In addition, a private party may be liable under § 1983, even if his actions
did not amount to formal conspiracy, if he is a "willful participan[t] in joint
activity with the state or its servants." 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 50, § 60, at 111.
The private party can be liable even if the state official is immune. Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982). Section 1343 provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person . .. (3) To redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, reg-
ulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the juris-
diction of the United States ....
Id.
60. For a definition of "subject matter jurisdiction," see infra note 109. For
a discussion of the limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,
see infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
61. See 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3573, at 189.
62. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
63. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972).
64. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction over section 1983 claims; this jurisdiction is concurrent 65
with federal court jurisdiction. 66 The Supreme Court has been un-
willing to recognize a preference on the part of plaintiffs for a
federal forum 67 and, in several recent opinions, has progressively
restricted access to federal court under section 1983.68 Thus, when
a plaintiff using pendent party jurisdiction in a section 1983 action
argues that it is more convenient and efficient to bring all his claims
in federal court, he may meet the argument that he could achieve
the same economy in state court.69
A plaintiff attempting to sue a municipality 0 under section 1983
faces additional hurdles. First, in Monroe v. Pape,71 the Supreme
Court held that municipalities were not "persons" under section
1983 and therefore could not be defendants in a section 1983 suit.
72
Upon reconsideration of the legislative history to section 1983, how-
ever, the Court later reversed this decision, in Monell v. Department
of Social Services.73 The Court qualified this reversal with dictum 74
65. For a definition of "concurrent jurisdiction," see infra notes 119-20 and
accompanying text.
66. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980).
67. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976). For a discussion of the current debate over whether
the courts should curtail a § 1983 plaintiff's 'ability to choose a federal forum,
see infra note 91. According to one commentator, because of restrictive Supreme
Court decisions and an increasingly conservative federal bench, many civil rights plain-
tiffs have begun to view state courts as more sympathetic to their claims, and therefore
prefer to litigate in state court. See Steinglass, The Emerging State Court Sec. 1983
Action: A Procedural Review, 38 U. MiAmi L. REv. 381, 386-99 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Steinglass, State Court Sec. 1983 Actions]; Steinglass, Lawyers Looking to
State Courts to Litigate Sec. 1983 Cases, Nat'l L.J. Feb. 18, 1985, at 42, col. 2.
68. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (negligent act of state
official causing unintentional deprivation of life, liberty, or property does not
implicate due process clause); Migra v. Warren City School Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75 (1984) (federal court must give res judicata effect to state court judgment);
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (when state affords plaintiff civil remedy
for intentional deprivation of property by state official, no denial of due process
has occurred); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (when state affords plaintiff
civil remedy for negligent deprivation of property by state official, no denial of
due process has occurred), overruled, Daniels, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986)); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (state court's determination of issues will collaterally
estop § 1983 plaintiff from raising those issues in federal court).
69. See, e.g., Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. One of Congress' primary motivations
in enacting § 1983, however, was to grant civil rights plaintiffs a federal forum.
See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
70. For the sake of simplicity, in this Note the term "municipality" refers to
municipalities, municipal corporations, cities, counties, towns, townships, boroughs,
and villages.
71. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
72. Id. at 187. R.S. § 1979 is the same statute as § 1983. See id. at 168.
73. 436 U.S. 658, 663, 665 (1978).
74. Because the Court in Monell found that the City of New York had established
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
stating that a section 1983 plaintiff could not sue a municipality
under a theory of respondeat superior." Instead, the Court said, a
plaintiff suing a municipality must at a minimum show that the
municipality's employees acted under a "governmental 'custom' "76
or "policy," 77 although the custom need not have "received formal
approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.""
Second, although a municipality is not shielded from federal court
jurisdiction by the eleventh amendment, and thus may be liable in
federal court for compensatory damages, 79 it is immune from punitive
damages. 0 The first hurdle in particular creates a significant re-
striction on a plaintiff's ability to recover any compensation for his
injury.8'
a "custom" or "policy" that had in fact caused the plaintiffs' injuries, see Monell,
436 U.S. at 690, the Court was able to rule in favor of the plaintiffs, see id. at
703, without considering the question of whether a municipality could be held
liable "solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, . . . on a
respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691 (emphasis in original). Thus the Court's
statements on respondeat superior went beyond the issue the Court needed to resolve
in order to decide the case. Statements that go beyond the question presented and
are not essential to the decision are "dicta." See Technograph Printed Circuits,
Ltd. v. Packard Bell Elec. Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 317 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
Justice Stevens concurred in part specifically to note that the part of the decision
concerning respondeat superior was dictum. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 714 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part) (opinion "merely advisory and ... not necessary to explain
the Court's decision"); see also I ANTIEAU, supra note 50, § 95, at 174; Comment,
Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U.
Cm. L. REV. 935, 935-36 & n.8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Section 1983 Municipal
Liability].
The Court, however, has subsequently made Monell's "custom or policy" re-
quirement the holding of the court. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808 (1985).
75. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663 n.7, 691-95.
76. Id. at 691.
77. Id. at 690.
78. Id. at 691. The Court emphasized that § 1983 imposes liability on a "person"
who "causes" a deprivation of civil rights. Id. at 691-92. The Court reasoned that
§ 1983 could therefore not "be easily read to impose liability vicariously." id. at
692, and that a "governmental 'custom' " or "policy" was the minimum necessary
to establish that the municipality had "caused" the deprivation. Id. at 692-95.
79. See id. at 690 n.54; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
80. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
81. Despite the fact that the Monell Court's original opinion on respondeat
superior was "merely advisory," see supra note 74 and accompanying text, the
Court later held that the custom or policy requirement was the law. See City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). In addition, the federal courts have
held that because of the reasoning of Aldinger and the custom or policy requirement of
Monell, a plaintiff cannot sue a municipality under state law on a theory of
respondeat superior and append the state-law claim to a § 1983 claim against the
municipal employee. See, e.g., Szumny v. Village of Addison, No. 85-C-5149, slip
op. (N.D. 111. Oct. 9, 1985) (available Jan. 11, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file); Christensen v. Phelan, 607 F. Supp. 470, 472-73 (D. Colo. 1985); Arancibia
1986]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XIV
2. Historical Origins of Section 1983
The statutes now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) are "direct descendants"'" of section one of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871,'1 enacted by the forty-second Congress, and commonly
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.84 As its popular name suggests,
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was directed primarily at the excesses
of the Ku Klux Klan against newly-freed blacks in the South."3 The
debates that led up to its enactment reveal that many of the members
of the forty-second Congress perceived an inability or unwillingness
of state law-enforcement and judicial officers to uphold the law
against the Klan.8 6 Thus, one of the motivating factors for creating
section 1983, and granting the federal courts jurisdiction over the
action, was the perception that state courts did not provide an
adequate remedy for people injured by the tortious acts of private
citizens.8'7
This perceived inadequacy was only one motivating factor, how-
v. Berry, 603 F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); McCaw v. Frame, 499 F. Supp.
424, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1980); La Rocco v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. 218, 221
(E.D.N.Y.. 1979).
82. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543 n.7 (1972),
83. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The substantive and
jurisdictional components of section one were separated in 1874, when Congress
codified federal law in the Revised Statutes. See Lynch, 405 U.S. at 543 n.7.
84. See 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3573, at 194.
85. Sections two through four of the Act "dealt primarily with" the purpose
of "suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in the Southern States." Monell, 436 U.S.
at 665. Section one, which is now § 1983, had a broader purpose, not only providing
"a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may have been that of slaves,
but also to all people where, under color of law, they ... may be deprived of
rights to which they are entitled under the Constitution .... ." CONG. GLOBE, app.
42d Cong., 1st Sess., 68 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger), reprinted In THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 493 (A. Avins ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as DEBATES].
86. As one member of Congress characterized the situation:
The arresting power is fettered, the witnesses are silenced, the courts are
impotent, the laws annulled, the criminal goes free, thg persecuted looks
in vain for redress. This condition of affairs extends to counties and
States; it is in many places the rule, and not the exception.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 379 (1871) (statement of Rep. Coburn), reprinted
in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS-PART 1 618 (B.
Schwartz ed. 1970); see id., at 458 (1871) (statement of Rep. Sherman), reprinted
in DEBATES, supra note 85, at 487-88; id. at 320-22 (statement of Rep. Stoughton),
reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 85, at 499-501.
87. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 33-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961),
overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs. 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
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ever. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was part of a larger movement,
after the Civil War, to expand federal power over the states.88 This
movement included the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments to the Constitution, as well as the enactment
of several Civil Rights Acts in the 1860's and 1870's and the grant
of general federal question jurisdiction in 1875.89 As the Supreme
Court later observed:
The predecessor of § 1983 was ... an important part of the
basic alteration in our federal system wrought in the Reconstruction
era through federal legislation and constitutional amendment. As
a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the post-
Civil War era-and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was its centerpiece-the role of the Federal Government
as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was
clearly established. 90
The role section 1983 played in this alteration in the federal system
again shows that granting access to a federal forum was at the heart
of Congress' enactment of section 1983. 91
88. See, e.g., Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. at 238-39, 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3573, at 194; Matasar,
Primer, supra note 22, at 109.
89. See supra note 88.
90. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 238-39.
91. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. Today, debate has arisen
over whether, relative to the federal courts, the state courts are less competent at
adjudicating constitutional issues. Compare R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
AND REFORM 185 (1985) (federal court judges and processes superior) [hereinafter
cited as POSNER] and M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER 2-3 (1980) (same) and Neuborne, The Myth of Purity, 90 HARv.
L. REV. 1105-30 (1977) (state courts less competent to decide constitutional issues)
and Sheran, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
789, 790-91 (1981) (state courts have not dealt effectively with civil rights issues)
with P. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605, 629-35 (1981) (questioning notion that state courts are less
competent in handling constitutional cases) and Steinglass, State Court Sec. 1983
Actions, supra note 67, at 398-99 ("the myth of federal court superiority should not
lead lawyers to make ... reflexive choices [that] are inconsistent with today's
reality") and Unravellitig, supra note 13, at 933 & n.201 (attacking, and noting
Supreme Court rejection of, position that federal courts are superior).
Similar debate has arisen over whether state courts are more biased than the federal
courts. Compare Redish, supra note 13, at 1390-91 (state judges subject to "subtle
but significant" pressures from state governments) with POSNER, supra, at 187 (state
courts "can be trusted to protect the innocent of whatever race") and Bator, Con-
gressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030,
1037 (1982) (state courts equally charged with vindication of federal rights than federal
counterparts).
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Today, considerable debate surrounds the question of what the
enacting Congress intended with regard to municipal liability. 92 This
debate has focused on the rejection of an amendment to the bill
that became the Civil Rights Act of 1871, commonly known as the
Sherman amendment. 93 The Sherman amendment would have im-
posed liability on a municipality for any injury occurring within its
borders that was caused by private persons "riotously and tumul-
tuously assembled," ' 94 even when the municipality could have done
nothing to prevent the injury. 95 The House of Representatives rejected
the Sherman amendment, 96 and a conference committee revised the
amendment to eliminate municipal liability except in those cases in
which the plaintiff was unable to execute a judgment against the
person who had caused the injury. 97 The House rejected this version
as well, apparently because opponents believed that the Constitution
prohibited the federal government from imposing an obligation on
municipalities to keep the peace. 98 The House refrained from passing
the amendment until it had discarded municipal liability altogether,
in favor of imposing liability on persons who had known of a
conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights and had failed
to prevent it. 99
92. The Supreme Court has expressed different views on the issue. See infra
notes 100-05 and accompanying text. Several commentators have disagreed with
the Court's current position on the import of Congress' rejection of the Sherman
amendment. See, e.g., 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 50, § 95, at 174; Section 1983 Municipal
Liability, supra note 74, at 970.
93. The amendment was to be added as a separate section, at the end of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Its
current version appears at § 1986 of Title 42 of the United States Code. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1986 (1982). Two versions of the amendment passed the Senate but not the
House of Representatives. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. Several
authorities have criticized each of the Court's two interpretations of the rejection
of the Sherman amendment. For critics of the first interpretation, which concluded
that municipalities were not "persons," see, for example, Kates & Kouba, Liability
of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CA.. L. REV.
131, 152-55 (1972); Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1483, 1491-94 (1977); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities For
Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 925 (1976). For authorities
criticizing the second interpretation, which precluded using respondeat superior
against a municipality, see supranote 92.
94. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 663 (1871), reprinted in Monell, 436
U.S. at 702 (appendix to opinion of the Court).
95. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 668, 692 n.57.
96. Id. at 666.
97. See id. at 668-69.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 668-69. This version is now codified at § 1986 of Title 42 of
the United States Code. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982).
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As discussed above, the Court originally held that the rejection
of the Sherman amendment demonstrated that Congress meant to
exclude municipalities from the scope of section 1983."' Upon later
reconsideration, however, the Court overruled itself, holding that
the rejection of the Sherman amendment could not be equated with
a refusal to impose any form of civil liability on municipalities.' °'
Focusing directly on the language of section one of the Civil Rights
Act, the Court held that Congress did in fact intend to include
municipalities as "persons" under that section.102 Nevertheless, the
Court thought the rejection of the Sherman amendment indicated
that Congress was disinclined to impose liability on municipalities
on a theory of vicarious liability.' 3 The Court therefore stated' °4
that a plaintiff could not sue a municipality under section 1983
under the theory of respondeat superior.' 5
Because of the Court's refusal to permit respondeat superior li-
ability, plaintiffs have sought to use pendent party jurisdiction to
append a state-law claim based on a theory of vicarious liability
against a municipality.' 6 Such attempts have met with little success
in the federal courts, because the courts hold that the reasoning of
Aldinger precludes this use of pendent party jurisdiction.'07
B. The Limited Nature of Federal Court Jurisdiction
A fundamental characteristic of the federal courts is that their
power to adjudicate cases is limited.'08 The federal courts may hear
only cases that are within their subject matter jurisdiction.'0 9 The
100. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961), overruled on other grounds,
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). R.S. § 1979 is the same
statute as § 1983. See id. at 169.
101. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-83.
102. See id. at 683-91.
103. See id. at 691-95.
104. The Court's language on the issue of the vicarious liability of municipalities
was originally dictum. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
105. 436 U.S. at 694-95.
106. See, e.g., Szumny v. Village of Addison, No. 85-C-5149, slip op. (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 9, 1985) (available Jan. 11, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Christensen v. Phelan, 607 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D. Colo. 1985); Arancibia v. Berry,
603 F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Locust v. Degiovanni, 485 F. Supp. 551
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
107. See, e.g., Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1048 (1978); Locust v. Degiovanni, 485 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
108. See Owen, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3522, at
60; Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 106.
109. 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3522, at 78. "Subject matter jurisdiction" has
been defined as a "court's competence to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which proceedings in question belong; the power to deal with the general
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limits of federal court subject matter jurisdiction arise from two
separate sources. First, article III of the United States Constitution
specifies nine categories of cases that the federal courts may hear.110
Most of these nine categories fall into two general types of juris-
diction: (1) federal question jurisdiction, which includes cases "arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made ... under their Authority";' and (2) diversity jurisdiction,
which includes controversies between parties of different political
allegiance, such as citizens of different states." 2
The second source is Congress:" '3 the federal courts lack the power
granted by the Constitution until Congress acts affirmatively to grant
that power." 4 Although the courts have held different views on the
relationship between the constitutional and congressional limits on
federal court power,'' the weight of authority is that Congress may
subject involved in the action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (5th ed. 1979).
The concept should be distinguished from "in personam jurisdiction," which has
been defined as the "[p]ower which a court has over the defendant's person and
which is required before a court can enter a ... judgment" affecting the defendant's
rights. Id. at 766. The burden of persuasion for establishing a federal court's
subject matter jurisdiction 'rests with the party invoking jurisdiction. Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612 n.28 (1979); McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
110. Article Ill provides that:
The [federal] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens
of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
111. U.S CONST. art. III, § 2. For a discussion of the meaning of "arising
under," see 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3562.
112. See U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 2. For a discussion of diversity jurisdiction,
see 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, §§ 3601-3608.
113. See 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3521, at 52-60; id. § 3526, at 227-30.
114. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (federal court jurisdiction "is further limited to those
subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction"); Cary v. Curtis, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) (federal court power is "dependent for its distribution
... entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating
the tribunals ... and of investing them with jurisdiction"); White v. Fenner, 29
F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547) (although Congress must grant full
power under article Ill, article Ill is not self-executing).
115. Compare Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816) (article
Ill is "manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the legislature") and Eisentrager v.
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restrict this power even further than the limits set by the Consti-
tution," 6 but may not expand it beyond those limits."
7
In contrast to the federal courts, the state courts are courts of
general jurisdiction."' This means that as long as Congress has not
provided that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, a state
court is presumed to have power to adjudicate any claim, even if
that claim is also within the province of the federal courts."19 Such
overlapping of jurisdiction is known as concurrent jurisdiction. 2'
Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (even without congressional grant,
Constitution compels exercise of jurisdiction in some federal court over cases arising
under Constitution, laws or treaties of United States), rev'd on other grounds, 339
U.S. 763 (1950); and Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between
Citizens of Different States Be Preserved?, 18 A.B.A. J. 499, 503 (1932) with Palmore
v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973) (Congress not "required to invest" federal
courts with "all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. II") and
City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966) (Congress has power "to
provide that all federal issuesbe tried in the federal courts [or] . . . in the courts of
the States") and Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 551 (1962) (Constitution
authorized but did not obligate Congress to create federal courts, and once created
federal courts remain subject to jurisdictional curtailment) and Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922) (effect of article Ill provision is not to vest jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts but to delimit cases and controversies over which Congress
can confer jurisdiction) and Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 (1850) (Con-
stitution has defined upper limit of judicial power, but has not prescribed how much
of it shall be exercised). See generally 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3526, at 230-35.
116. E.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973); Lockerty v.
Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234
(1922); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). See generally 13 WRIGHT,
supra note 1, § 3526, at 232-33 & n.18. In fact, Congress has never granted federal
courts the full power available under the Constitution. See 13 WRIGHT, supra note
1, § 3526, at 230. Until 1875, Congress did not make a general grant of federal
question jurisdiction, see Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § I, 18 Stat. 470 (1875)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)), instead creating specialized statutes directed
at particular types of cases. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982) (statute granting
jurisdiction over § 1983 cases); see 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3561, at 4.
Moreover, even after granting jurisdiction over general federal questions, Congress
imposed a requirement that such cases involve a minimum amount in controversy,
see 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3561.1, at 5, and did not abolish this requirement
until 1980. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980); see
13B WRIGHT, supra note I, § 3561.1, at 5.
117. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809)
(congressional "statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the
constitution"); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding
congressional act granting Supreme Court original jurisdiction over case not within
constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to be unconstitutional); see also 13
WRIGHT, supra note I, § 3526, at 229 & n.6.
118. See 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3522, at 60.
119. For a discussion of exclusive jurisdiction, see 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1,
§ 3527.
120. For a discussion of concurrent jurisdiction, see 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1,
§ 3527.
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C. Forms of Supplemental Jurisdiction
Early in the history of the federal courts, the limited nature of
their jurisdiction created a difficult problem: when a case contained
some claims within the limits of federal court jurisdiction and some
without, did the federal court have power to adjudicate the nonfederal
claims? 21
121. The question first arose in 1824, in the case of Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), and indeed poses a dilemma. On
the one hand, a rule absolutely barring a federal court from hearing nonfederal
claims could effectively eviscerate the ability of a federal court to function at all.
See, e.g., Owen, 437 U.S. at 377 ("Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction
of federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable to . . . effectively resolve an en-
tire, logically entwined lawsuit"); Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 818, 821; 13B
WRIGHT, supra note I, § 3567, at 107 ("a court of original jurisdiction could not
function ... unless it had power to decide all the questions that the case presents");
id. § 3523, at 85 (without ancillary jurisdiction, a "federal court neither could dispose
of the principal case effectively nor do complete justice in the dispute that is before
the tribunal"); Pendent Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 131.
State and federal claims are sometimes so closely related that the inability to
decide both simultaneously would mean an incomplete remedy under the claim the
court did adjudicate. See, e.g., Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 820. Moreover, an
absolute bar would diminish efficiency and convenience in the court system as a
whole. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 35 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 13 WRIGHT, supra note
1, § 3523, at 95.
Plaintiffs with federal claims of exclusive jurisdiction would be forced to split
their cases between federal and state court, and the inefficiency of piecemeal litigation
would result. See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 738 (D.C. Cir.
1969) ("important policy of having one single expeditious resolution of a dispute
has thus led to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction and analogous practices"); 13
WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 86; Green, Federal Jurisdiction Over Counterclaims,
48 Nw. U.L. REv. 271, 271 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Green]. But see Unravelling,
supra note 13, at 942.
Even if jurisdiction over the federal claims were concurrent, a defendant might
choose to remove the case to federal court, again forcing the plaintiff to split his
claims. Section 1441(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code allows a defendant
to remove any federal claims in a case to federal court, whether or not the plaintiff
acquiesces. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982). Thus even a plaintiff who brought suit
in state court could be forced to split his case if the defendant chose to remove
the federal claims. See Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 113 n.42. And, even
when jurisdiction is concurrent and the plaintiff is able to bring the entire suit in
state court, there is still another cost to the federal system, for the congressional
intent that federal courts interpret issues of federal law would be undermined. See,
e.g., Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 31-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also 13 WRIGHT,
supra note 1, § 3523, at 104; Redish, supra note 13, at 1391. Finally, an absolute
bar on extending federal court jurisdiction would diminish a plaintiff's unrestricted
choice between federal and state courts, and thwart congressional intent to provide
that choice. See Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 113 & n.42.
On the other hand, if extended too far, a doctrine permitting federal courts to
adjudicate nonfederal claims would undermine the constitutionally- and congres-
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The courts, in wrestling with this question, have developed three
doctrines of supplemental jurisdiction:' 2 ancillary jurisdiction," 3 pen-
dent jurisdiction"' and pendent party jurisdiction. 25
1. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Ancillary jurisdiction allows a federal court to decide certain types
of claims when they are incidental to another claim that is properly
within the court's jurisdiction.'1 Under current law, many courts
hold that ancillary jurisdiction supports a nonfederal claim whenever
the two claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. 27
sionally-imposed limits on federal court jurisdiction. See Unravelling, supra note
13, at 932-33; supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text. In addition, an expansive
use of pendent party jurisdiction would impinge greatly on the power of the state
courts. See Onesti v. Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1262, 1264
(N.D. 111. 1985); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
20 STAN. L. REV. 262, 262 (1968); Unravelling, supra note 13, at 933-34 & n.203.
Some authorities believe that the federal docket is already overburdened, and argue
that a doctrine that permits any further extension of jurisdiction should be curtailed.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 91, at 129-30, 318-19. But see Green, supra, at 279
(additional burden will be slight).
122. See 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 82; id. § 3567, at 109; id. § 3567.2, at
153. For the origin of the term supplemental jurisdiction, see supra note 33.
123. For a definition and discussion of ancillary jurisdiction, see infra notes 126-
55 and accompanying text.
124. For a definition and discussion of pendent jurisdiction, see infra notes 156-
93 and accompanying text.
125. For a definition and discussion of pendent party jurisdiction, see infra notes
194-233 and accompanying text. Numerous authorities have raised doubts about
the validity of making a conceptual distinction among these doctrines, see, e.g.,
Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 105, 117, 152-53, and have asserted that the
courts should apply the Aldinger test to ordinary pendent claims. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 439-40 (7th Cir. 1982); Luneburg,
supra note 21, at 244; Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 178; Pendent Jurisdiction,
supra note 13, at 135; Law-Tied Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 632-33, 646-48;
Redish, supra note 13, at 1396; Capra, supra note 13, at 22, col. 3. But see Schenkier,
Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction,
75 Nw. U.L. REV. 245, 259 (1980) (pendent claim jurisdiction should not be rejected
as usurpation of congressional authority simply because pendent party jurisdiction
has been rejected). Similarly, some commentators have asserted that the courts should
apply the Aldinger test to ancillary jurisdiction claims. See, e.g., 13 WRIGHT, supra
note 1, § 3523, at 102-03; Luneburg, supra note 21, at 244; Matasar, Primer, supra
note 22, at 178; Redish, supra note 13, at 1397-98. Nevertheless, the courts continue
to adhere to this tripartite framework. See Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 117-18.
126. See Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 810 (2d
Cir. 1979); see also I J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN, J. WICKER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0.90[31, at 828.1 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter cited
as MOOlE]; 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 82.
127. See I MOORE, supra note 126, 0.90[31, at 830-31; 3 MOORE, supra note
126, 13.36, at 13-219; 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 95 & n.32.
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These courts have borrowed the concept of "same transaction or
occurrence" from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which have
defined some types of claims-such as compulsory counterclaims '28
and cross-claims' 29 -by whether they arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the plaintiff's primary claim. 30 Thus, courts using
a "same transaction or occurrence test" have held that any claim
that meets the test for the Federal Rules will also meet the test for
ancillary jurisdiction. 3'
In addition, the courts have found ancillary jurisdiction over
claims that are "logically dependent" on the main claim.'3 2 Under
this test, courts have, again referring to the Federal Rules, rou-
tinely exercised jurisdiction over claims based on impleader'" or
128. See, e.g, Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 606-09 (1926);
see also, 3 MooRE, supra note 126, 1 13.151], at 13-96 & nn.4 & 6; 13 WRIGHT,
supra note I, § 3523, at 106-07 & n.59. A "counterclaim" has been defined as
"a claim presented by a defendant in opposition to or deduction from the claim
of the plaintiff." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (5th ed. 1979). Counterclaims are
"either compulsory (required to be made) or permissive (made at option of defend-
ant)." Id. A counterclaim is "compulsory" if it arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim and does not "require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." See
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Ancillary jurisdiction supports claims against new parties
joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(h). 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, §
3523, at 107-08 X n.60. For a definition of "permissive counterclaims," see infra
note 137.
129. See, e.g., Transcontinental Underwriters Agency v. American Agency Un-
derwriters, 680 F.2d 298, 299 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982); see also 3 MOORE, supra note
126, 13.36, at 13-219 & n.l; 13 WRIGHT, supra note I, § 3523, at 109. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define a cross-claim as a claim "by one party
against a co-party" that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence "that is
the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein .... 
FED. R. Crv. P. 13(g).
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a); id. 13(g).
131. See 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 95 n.32. Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, certain types of claims contain, as part of their definition, a
requirement that they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as another
claim in the suit. For example, under the Federal Rules, counterclaims are considered
compulsory only when they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
opposing party's claim. See FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a). The courts have held that any
claim that meets the definition of a compulsory counterclaim is automatically
supported by ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert
Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1961); Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102
F. Supp. 214, 226-27 (N.D. Iowa 1952).
132. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 375 n.18; 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523,
at 96.
133. See, e.g., Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.
1965); see also 3 MOORE, supra note 126, 1 14.26, at 14-108 & n.6; id., 1 14.26,
at 14-111 & n.14; 13 WRIGHT, supra note I, § 3523, at 109-11 & n.65. "Impleader"
is the procedure by which a party brings a new party into the action on the ground
that the new party "is or may be liable to [the party who joins him] for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him." See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Ancillary
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interpleader,'3 4 and claims of intervenors as of right.'" Under this
logical dependence reasoning, the courts have also held that an-
cillary jurisdiction supports any claim necessary to execute or
protect federal judgments. ,36
The courts have not, however, extended ancillary jurisdiction to
those claims that the Federal Rules do not define as arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence, i.e., permissive counterclaims,'37
permissive intervention'38 or claims of indispensable parties.'3 9 The
jurisdiction will also support claims brought by the impleaded party directly against
the plaintiff. See 3 MooRE, supra note 126, 14.27[2], at 14-117 to -118. When
a plaintiff, however, asserts a claim against an impleaded party directly, ancillaryjurisdiction will not support it. Owen, 437 U.S. at 375-77; 3 MOORE, supra note
126, 1 14.27[1], at 14-116.
134. 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 113 & n.67. "Interpleader" is the
procedure that permits a person, "[wihen two or more persons claim the same
thing (or fund) of [his], and he, laying no claim to it himself, is ignorant which
of them has a right to it, and fears he may be prejudiced by their proceeding
against him to recover it," to "join such claimants as defendants and require them
to interplead their claims so that he may not be exposed to double or multiple
liability." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 733 (5th ed. 1979).
135. Owen, 437 U.S. at 375 n.18 (dictum); 1 MOORE, supra note 126, 0.90[3],
at 831-32; 3B MOORE, supra note 126, 1 24.18(1], at 24-198 to -199, -200. An
"intervenor" is "a person who voluntarily interposes in an action or other proceeding
with the leave of the court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 736 (5th ed. 1979). An
intervenor "as of right" is an intervenor: (1) to whom "a statute of the United
States confers an unconditional right to intervene"; or (2) who "claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and [who]
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless [his] interest is adequately
represented by existing parties." FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a). For a definition of "per-
missive intervention," see infra note 138.
136. 1 MooRE, supra note 126, 1 0.9013], at 829; cf. 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1,
§ 3523, at 82-86 & n.9.
137. 3 MOORE, supra note 126, 1 13.19[1], at 13-124 to 13-126; 13 WRIGHT,
supra note 1, § 3523, at 108-09. The courts make one exception to this rule, holding
that ancillary jurisdiction supports permissive counterclaims in the form of set-offs.
See 3 MoORE, supra note 126, 13.19[11, at 13-126; 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1,§ 3523, at 109. A "permissive counterclaim" is a "claim against an opposing party
not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim." FED. R. CIv. P. 13(b) (emphasis added). For a definition
of "compulsory counterclaim," see supra note 128.
138. 3B MOORE, supra note 126, 1 24.18[1], at 24-200; 13 WRIGHT, supra note
I, § 3523, at 113. Intervention is "permissive" when: (1) "a statute of the United
States confers a conditional right to intervene"; or (2) the intervenor's "claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." FED.
R. Clv. P. 24(b) (emphasis added). For a definition of "intervenor" and "intervenor
as of right," see supra note 135.
139. 3A MOORE, supra note 126, 19.04[2.-2], at 19-64 & n.1; 13 WRIGHT,
supra note 1, § 3523, at 109-112 & n.66. An "indispensable party" is a person
"without whose presence no adequate judgment can be entered determining rights
of parties before a court," or who has "such an interest in the controversy that
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courts have never limited ancillary jurisdiction to cases involving
pendent claims-courts have frequently used the doctrine to assert
power over pendent parties as well.'14
At first glance, these rules may seem arbitrary, and in fact, a
number of commentators have questioned whether any rational basis
supports such a complicated scheme.' 4' The complexity arises from
the piecemeal development of the doctrine, as well as the variety
of justifications courts have offered for exercising ancillary juris-
diction. 42
The doctrine first arose in the context of in rem disputes. 43 In
1926, however, the Court expanded ancillary jurisdiction in the case
of Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,'44 and since then, the
the court cannot render a final decree without affecting [his] interests." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 696 (5th ed. 1979).
140. See, e.g., Bauer v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 630 F.2d 1287, 1290 n.2, (8th Cir.
1980); 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 107-09. The only limitation the Supreme
Court has placed on the use of ancillary jurisdiction to support claims against new
parties is its prohibition against plaintiffs using the doctrine to bring claims directly
against new parties. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365
(1978).
141. See, e.g., 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 115; Green, supra note 121,
at 284-89.
142. See infra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
143. In rem disputes are defined as "proceedings or actions instituted against
the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be In personam."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis in original), In Freeman
v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861), generally considered the leading ancillary
jurisdiction case, see, e.g., 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 87, the federal
court had jurisdiction over several railroad cars that a United States marshal had
seized from a railroad company. 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 453. The marshal had
obtained writs of attachment from the federal court. Id. In response, the mortgagees
of the railroad sued in state court to replevy the railroad cars. Id. The state court
granted the mortgagees a writ of replevin, under which the county sheriff took
possession of the railroad cars. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the state court had improperly interfered
with the power of the federal court over the property. Id. The mortgagees had
argued that such a ruling would leave them remediless. Id. at 460. The Court
disagreed, holding that the mortgagees could intervene in the federal proceeding
with their state-law claim to the property and that the federal court could properly
take jurisdiction over their claim. See id. The Court asserted that when a nonfederal
claim is filed "to restrain or regulate" a federal court judgment, it could be
considered "ancillary and dependent," and therefore within the jurisdiction of the
court. Id.
After Freeman, the courts generally restricted its principle to in rem cases. See,
e.g., Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925); 13 WRIGHT, supra
note 1, § 3523, at 88-89 & n.16. Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper note that
as late as 1925, the Court continued to maintain that ancillary jurisdiction could
support only claims related to property at least constructively under the court's
control. See id. at 93. :
144. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). In Moore, the plaintiff sued in federal court on the
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federal courts have continued the expansion. 41 One factor contrib-
uting to the expansion was the liberalization of joinder rules effec-
tuated by the promulgation, in 1938, of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 46 The Federal Rules did not in themselves alter the law
on subject matter jurisdiction, and in fact Rule 82 explicitly prohibits
them from doing so.147 Nevertheless, by replacing the former rules
of joinder with more liberal standards, the Federal Rules provided
litigants with the opportunity to join many more claims and parties
in one lawsuit.'4 8 The Federal Rules thus increased the demand for
and usefulness of ancillary jurisdiction. 49
In the 1978 case of Owen Equipment & Erection Cp. v. Kroger,"0
however, the Court checked the expansion of ancillary jurisdiction,
by making it explicit that the doctrine was available only to a party
who is in a defensive "posture,"'' or, as the Court described it,
a party who has been "haled into court against his will, or ...
whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them
in an ongoing action in a federal court.' 51 2 According to the Court,
a plaintiff could not reasonably demand ancillary jurisdiction when
it was he who had chosen the federal forum "and must thus accept
basis of a federal question-a claim arising out of the Sherman Act. Id. at 602,
604. The defendant brought a state-law compulsory counterclaim. Id. at 603. The
claim was compulsory under the Equity Rules of 1912, because it arose out of the
same transaction. See id.; at 609-10. The court did not have in rem jurisdiction;
nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the court had power to hear the state-
law counterclaim, even after dismissing the federal claim on the merits. Id. at 608-
09; see Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 116-17. The Court reasoned that the
connection between the federal and nonfederal claims was so close "that it only
needs the failure of the former to establish a foundation for the latter," and noted
that if the federal court were unable to decide the counterclaim, "the relief afforded
by the dismissal of the [plaintiff's claim] is not complete." 270 U.S. at 610. The Court
in Moore thus effectively dispensed with the prior practice of limiting ancillary.
jurisdiction to in rem cases and changed the focus of the analysis to the logical
relationship between the claims. See Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 142.
145. See 13 WIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 94.
146. See id.
147. See id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (Federal Rules neither create nor
withdraw jurisdiction).
148. See 13 WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3523, at 94-95.
149. Id.
150. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Owen,
see infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
151. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 373, 376.
152. Id. Even before Owen, the courts had generally limited ancillary jurisdiction
to claims asserted by defensive parties. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 375 n.18; 3 MOORE,
supra note 126, 1 14.27[1], at 14-116. Thus, the plaintiff's attempt to use ancillary
jurisdiction in Owen was an attempt to expand the doctrine beyond its recognized
limits.
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its limitations."'' 3 The Court then analyzed the case as a pendent
party jurisdiction case. 54 Hence, the Court made it clear that parties
that are not in a defensive posture, such as plaintiffs, must turn
to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.'
2. Pendent Jurisdiction
Like ancillary jurisdiction, pendent jurisdiction permits a federal
court to adjudicate nonfederal claims when they are sufficiently
related to a federal claim already before the court.5 6 The law on
pendent jurisdiction, however, differs from that of ancillary juris-
diction in several ways,' which arise primarily from the fact that
the two doctrines developed from separate lines of cases.'
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,5 9 the original ancestor
of pendent jurisdiction,16° the Supreme Court held that a federal
court with jurisdiction over a case can hear all questions-even state-
153. Id.
154. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
155. See infra note 157. For a discussion of pendent jurisdiction, see infra notes
156-93 and accompanying text.
156. "Pendent jurisdiction" has been described as the doctrine that "permits a
plaintiff, in appropriate circumstances, to join with his federal claim a related state
claim over which the court has no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction."
Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 477 F. Supp. 615,
622 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
157. The Second Circuit has contrasted pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as
follows:
Pendent jurisdiction . .. applies to state law claims which are joined in
the complaint with federally cognizable claims and which are asserted
by the original plaintiff against the original defendant .... It is the
combination of state and federal claims in a complaint that gives rise
to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. On the other hand, when, sub-
sequent to the filing of the complaint, a party other than the original
plaintiff injects state claims into a controversy as counterclaims, cross-
claims, or third-party claims, such claims fall within the court's ancillary
jurisdiction rather than its pendent jurisdiction.
Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 810 (2d Cir. 1979)
(emphasis added). Thus, ancillary jurisdiction has traditionally been reserved for
parties in a defensive "posture," Owen, 437 U.S. at 376, while pendent jurisdiction
is available for plaintiffs. See Corporacion Venezolana, 477 F. Supp. at 622 n. 13.
158. See supra notes 143-49, infra notes 159-93 and accompanying text.
159. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Osborn, a federal statute incorporated
the Bank of the United States and gave it the right to sue and be sued in the
circuit courts of the United States. See id. at 817. The Bank sued a state tax
auditor under the federal statute, seeking to enjoin the auditor from collecting a
tax on the Bank under state law. See id. at 739-40. The defendants argued that
because the case involved several issues of state law, it did not "arise under a law
of the United States," and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction. See id. at
819.
160. See, e.g., 13B WRIGHT, supra note I, § 3567, at 106.
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law questions-that are necessary to decide the matter.' 6' As the
Court expressed it:
[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original
cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts
jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of
law may be involved in it. 162
Osborn's holding has been characterized as one of necessity: it is
seen as compelled because if a federal court were confined to deciding
only some of the issues raised by a case, as a practical matter it
could not function as a court. 163 Indeed, as Chief Justice John
Marshall observed in his opinion for the Court, "[tihere is scarcely
any case, every part of which depends upon" federal law.' 64
The Court moved beyond the notion of necessity in the case of
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad."56 In Siler, the Supreme
Court held that the existence of federal questions in the case gave
a federal court jurisdiction, regardless of the presence of a state-
law claim.' 66 More important, the Court held that the federal court
could decide the case solely on the state-law question:
[H]aving properly obtained [jurisdiction], that court had the right
to decide all the questions in the case, even though it decided
the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even
if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local
or state questions only.'17
161. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822. The court held that "[tlhose other questions
cannot arrest the proceedings." Id.
162. Id. at 823.
163. See, e.g., Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 808
& n.16 (2d Cir. 1979); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 922 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3567, at
107.
164. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 820.
165. 213 U.S. 175 (1909), overruled on other grounds, Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (eleventh amendment bars adjudication
of pendent claims against states and their officials). In Siler, the plaintiff, a railroad
company, brought suit in a federal circuit court under several provisions of the
Constitution and under state law. See 213 U.S. at 176-77, 190-91. The plaintiff
sought to enjoin a state commission from regulating its rates. See id. The state
commission argued that not only did the circuit court lack jurisdiction over the
state-law claim, but also that the very existence of a state-law claim in the case
acted to deprive the court of jurisdiction over the federal claims as well. Id. at
183, 192. The court rejected both parts of the argument. Id. at 191-93.
166. Id. at 191.
167. Id. In fact, the Court stated that it is "much better" to decide the case
on the state-law issue, "rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional
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The. Court then affirmed on the basis of the state-law claim alone. 68
Such a holding was not, strictly speaking, a matter of necessity
to preserve the circuit court's ability to function as a court. The
court could have just dismissed the state-law claim and decided the
case on the basis of the constitutional claims alone, for the two claims
were not 'inextricably interwoven like the claims in Osborn.'" As the
Court acknowledged, "[tihe various questions are entirely separate
from each other."' The decision thus brought pendent jurisdiction
away from the idea that it was to be used only when necessary. The
Court focused instead on policy concerns: it wanted to avoid un-
necessarily addressing constitutional questions 7 ' and creating piece-
meal litigation. 72
After Sler had broadened the rationale for pendent jurisdiction,
the question of when a state-law claim might be considered part of
the whole "case" became more pressing.'"7 The Court addressed this
issue in Hum v. Oursler,17 4 creating a relatively stringent test, based
on the concept of "cause of action."' 7  The Court distinguished
between two 'kinds of cases: (1) cases in which the federal and
nonfederal claims were "two distinct grounds" of one cause of
action; and (2) cases in which the federal and nonfederal claims
were "two separate and distinct causes of action."'' 76 The Court
held that only in the former type of case could a court exercise
pendent jurisdiction.'7
Because -"cause of action" was an ill-defined concept, the lower
questions appearing in the record." Id. at 193. The Court continues to implement
this policy of avoiding constitutional questions. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528 (1974).
168. 213 U.S. at 198.
169. See 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3567, at 108.
170. 213 U.S. at 193.
171. See supra note 167.
172. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 163, at 922; 13B WRIGHT, supra note
1, § 3567, at 108, 111. .
173. See 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3567, at 107-10.
174. 289 U.S. 238 (1933), overruled, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966). In Hurn, the plaintiffs were the authors of a play, which appeared in
two versions: one copyrighted, the other not. Under federal law, plaintiffs sought
to enjoin the defendants from infringing the copyrighted version. The plaintiffs
also brought a state-law claim to enjoin the defendants' unfair competition in the
copyrighted version of the play, and: a similar state-law claim to enjoin unfair
competition in the uncopyrighted version. 289 U.S.:at 239. The trial court dismissed
the federal claim :on the merits and the two state-law claims for lack of jurisdiction.
Id. at 239-40. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 240.
175. Id. at 245-46.
176. Id.
177. Id. Thus, the Court held, only the state-law claim for the copyrighted version
of the play was supported by pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 248.
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courts found the Hrn test unworkable and tended to apply it in
an overly restrictive way. 78 In 1966, the Court therefore altered this
"unnecessarily grudging" test. 179 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 80
rejected the Hum "cause of action" test in favor of a test essentially
based on the factual relationship between the federal and nonfederal
claims.'"' The Court created a two-step analysis; 82 the first step
focusing on the power of the court to hear the claim, the second,
on the court's discretion to refuse a claim over which it had power.'83
Under the first step, which the Court later called the "constitu-
tional" part of the analysis, 84 a court must find that the case satisfies
three requirements.8 5 First, the federal claim must be "substan-
tial.' ' 8 6 Second, the federal and nonfederal claims must arise from
178. See 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3567, at 112; Matasar, Primer, supra
note 22, at 120. Similarly, today, because the Aldinger test involves the poorly-
defined concept of congressional "negation," see supra notes 20-23, infra note 230
and accompanying text, the lower federal courts are applying the Aldinger test in
an overly restrictive manner. See infra notes 231-81 and accompanying text.
179. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), overruled on
other grounds, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (jurisdiction over primary
claim not a prerequisite to resolution of pendent claim; mootness of primary claim
does not bar pendent jurisdiction).
180. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
181. Id. at 725.
182. See 13B WRIGHT, supra note I, § 3567, at 113.
183. See id.
184. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 371.
185. Some debate has arisen over whether Gibbs imposes three requirements or
two. The issue revolves around Whether the "common nucleus" requirement and
the requirement that a plaintiff "ordinarily be expected to try" the claims in one
proceeding should be read as: (1) redundant, see, e.g., Matasar, Primer, supra note
22, at 134-39; (2) alternative, see, e.g., Baker, Toward a More Relaxed View of
Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 759 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Baker]; or (3) cumulative. See, e.g., 13B WlOHT, supra note 1, § 3567.1,
at 116 & n.8. According to the first view, the "expected to try" requirement is merely
a rephrasing of the "common nucleus" test, and adds nothing substantive to the
decision. See Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 134-39; Matasar, Rediscovering,
supra note 20, at 1457-58. The second view finds :only two requirements in this
language, because it sees the "common nucleus" and "expected to try" requirements
as alternative (i.e., satisfaction of either of the two would be sufficient). See Baker,
supra, at 764-84. Under the third view, the two requirements are cumulative (i.e.,
each must be satisfied 'independently), and hence the Gibbs test for whether a court
has power to adjudicate a nonfederail claim contains three requirements. See, e.g.,
13B WiuoHT, supra note 1, § 3567.1, at 116; Unravelling, supra~note 13, at 901-02
& n.32. Most courts adhere to this "cumulative" view, see 13B WIoHT, supra note
I" § 3567.1,:at 116 & n.8; Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 135 &'n:.155, at least
in theory. One commentator has noted that in practice, many courts "either ignore
the requirement altogether, cite the language without analysis, or subsume it in the
common nucleus test." Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 138.
186. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Graf v.
Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 697 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1983).
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a "common nucleus of operative fact."' 8 7 Finally, the claims must
be related in such a way that the plaintiff "would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."' 8
Under the second step, a federal court may exercise its discretion
to dismiss pendent claims even though it has power to hear them. 89
In exercising this discretion, the Court said, the federal courts should
consider the factors of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to the litigants."'' 9
The lower federal courts greatly expanded their use of pendent
jurisdiction under the Gibbs test, rarely dismissing pendent claims
for discretionary reasons.' 9' As a part of this expansion, federal
courts began exercising jurisdiction over state-law claims that drew
an additional party into the suit. 92 This practice became known as
"pendent party jurisdiction." 93
3. Pendent Party Jurisdiction
Unlike ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court
initiated, 9' pendent party jurisdiction first developed in the lower
federal courts. 95 The Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively on
its validity,' 96 although it has consistently checked the growth of the
doctrine each time it has considered it.197
187. 383 U.S. at 725.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 726.
190. Id. In addition, the courts should ordinarily dismiss state-law claims when
the federal claims have been dismissed before trial, or if the state-law claims
"substantially predominate," or if trying the claims together would be likely to
cause jury confusion. Id. at 726-27.
191. 13B WRIaT, supra note 1, § 3567.1, at 144.
192. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
193. See 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3567.2, at 145-46.
194. See supra notes 142-45, 159-93 and accompanying text.
195. See 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3567.2, at 148-52.
196. See infra notes 203-33 and accompanying text.
197. In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), overruled, Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local school board not
immune from § 1983 action), and Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 720 (1975),
the Court avoided deciding any issue concerning pendent party jurisdiction. See
infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. In Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1
(1976), the Court checked the expansion of the doctrine by imposing an additional
step in the analysis, involving an examination of congressional intent. See infra
notes 215-20 and accompanying text. In Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365 (1978), the Court reaffirmed its decision to impose the additional
step, and precluded the use of pendent party jurisdiction in a diversity case to
overcome the requirement of complete diversity. See infra notes 226-29 and ac-
companying text.
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After the case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,198 the federal
courts generally became more liberal in their use of pendent juris-
diction.199 Some courts began to take jurisdiction over pendent claims
even when such claims involved parties who were not part of the
original suit.'0° Many of these courts drew support from the language
in Gibbs indicating that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." 0'
Other courts declined to use pendent jurisdiction for such claims.2 2
The Supreme Court explicitly avoided ruling on the validity of
pendent party jurisdiction in two cases that arose in the 1970's. In
Moor v. County of Alameda2°3 and Philbrook v. Glodgett,2 °0 the
Court noted that the issue was "subtle and complex ' 25 and disposed
of the cases on either discretionary or prudential grounds. 20 A year
after Philbrook, the Court was faced with a case that forced it
to confront the pendent party issue directly. This case was Aldinger
v. Howard.20 7
In Aldinger, the plaintiff brought suit in federal court under section
1983, alleging that she had been dismissed from a position with the
office of the treasurer of Spokane County, Washington, in violation
of her constitutional rights. 208 The action named the County and
several of its officials as defendants. 20 9 The district court dismissed
Aldinger's claim against the County, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
restating its longstanding ban on pendent party jurisdiction. 210
198. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
199. 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3567.2, at 144.
200. Id. at 146-51.
201. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724 (emphasis added).
202. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411
U.S. 693 (1973); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136, 137 (9th Cir. 1969); Williams v.
United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969).
203. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
204. 421 U.S. 707 (1975).
205. Moor, 411 U.S. at 715; Philbrook, 421 U.S. at 720.
206. In Moor, the Court held only that the district court had not abused its
discretion in dismissing the pendent party. 411 U.S. at 716-17. In Philbrook, the
Court dismissed an appeal by the pendent party because the district court's exercise
of pendent party jurisdiction over him had "resulted in no adjudication on the
merits that could not have been just as properly made without the [pendent party],
and ha[d] resulted in no issuance of process against [him] which he ha[d] properly
contended to be wrongful before this Court." 421 U.S. at 722.
207. 427 U.S. i (1976); see 3A MOORE, supra note 126, J 20.07[5.-1, at 20-
77.
208. 427 U.S. at 3.
209. Id. at 4.
210. Id. at 5.
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The Supreme Court affirmed,"' but explicitly limited its decision
to the narrow issue presented by the facts.112 Hence, the Court
refrained from eradicating the doctrine entirely. '3 The Court held
that when a litigant sought to use pendent jurisdiction to join a
new party to the suit, and Congress had addressed the issue of
federal court jurisdiction over such a party, the two-part test de-
lineated in Gibbs was only the first part of the 'analysis.214
The Gibbs test, as the Court later made explicit, 2  determined
only whether the Constitution permitted the extension of jurisdiction
to a pendent claim. 21 6 It was also necessary to determine whether
Congress, which like the Constitution limits federal court jurisdic-
tion,2 7 permitted such an extension. 28 In the words of the Court,
"[b]efore it can be concluded that [pendent party] jurisdiction exists,
a federal court must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it,
but that Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not
expressly or by implication negated its existence. ' 21 9
Under Aldinger, then, the analysis involves three inquiries: (1)
whether article III of the Constitution has given the federal court
power to hear the claim (the "constitutional" analysis); (2) whether
Congress has expressly or implicitly negated jurisdiction (the "sta-
tutory" analysis); and (3) whether the court should exercise its
discretion to use its power to hear the claim (the "discretionary"
analysis). °220
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist took care to limit
this new rule to pendent party cases in which the federal claim :arose
out of section 1983.221 Stating that "[f]or purposes of . . . this case
. . . it [is] quite unnecessary to formulate any general, all-encom-
passing jurisdictional rule," he declined to decide "whether there
are any 'principled' differences between pendent and ancillary ju-
211. Id. at 19.
212. See id. at 18; Grimes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 841, 844 (2d
Cir. 1977).
213. Id. at 13, 18; see also Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d
1336, 1360 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., separate opinion).
214. 427 U.S. at 14-16.
215. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 (1978).
216. See id.
217. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
218. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13-16 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 18.
220. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Local 99, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-
CIO, 536 F. Supp. 1203, 1221 (D.R.I. 1982).
221. See Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied
sub nom. Lewy v. Weinberger, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Grimes v. Chrylser Motors
'CorD.. 565 F.2d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1977).
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risdiction; or, if there are, what effect Gibbs had on such differ-
ences. ' 222 In addition, he noted that "[other statutory grants and
other alignments of parties and claims might call for a different
result."223
The Court applied its newly-formulated test to sections 1343(3)
and 1983, the statutes at issue in Aldinger, and held that Congress
had indeed "expressly or by impliqation negated" jurisdiction over
a municipality such as Spokane County. 224 The Court therefore
affirmed the dismissal of Aldinger's claim. 2 1
Two years later, in Owen, the Court applied the Aldinger test
again, this time construing section 1332 of Title 28 of the United
States Code, the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction. 226 In Owen,
Kroger brought a state-law tort claim in federal court on the basis
of diversity of citizenship. The defendant impleaded Owen Equipment
& Erection Co. as a third-party defendant and Kroger amended her
complaint to assert a state-law claim against Owen. During trial,
Kroger discovered that she and Owen were not diverse, and Owen
moved to dismiss the case. The district court denied this motion
and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that Gibbs permitted the
retention of jurisdiction .22
The Supreme Court reversed and, analyzing the case as a pendent
party case, held that Congress had negated jurisdiction over claims
between nondiverse parties in a suit based upon section 1332.228 The
Court reasoned that Congress' reenactment of section 1332 after the
Court had construed it to require complete diversity showed both
congressional ratification of the requirement and congressional intent
to exclude nondiverse parties: from the coverage of section 1332.229
According to several authorities, neither Aldinger nor Owen has
provided the lower federal courts with a clear idea of what "ne-
gation" is or how to determine whether Congress has "negated"
pendent party jurisdiction.230 As a result, considerable uncertainty
222. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13.
223. Id. at 18.
224. Id. at 16-19. For a detailed discussion of the analysis the Court employed
to determine that :Congress had negated jurisdiction, see infra notes: 282-362 and
accompanying text.
225. Id. at 19. For a more in-depth discussion of the Court's analysis in Aldinger,'
see infra notes 311-42 and accompanying text.
226. 437 U.S. 365, 373-75 (1978).
227. Id. at 367-69.
228. Id. at 373-77.
229. Id. at 373-74., For a more in-depth discussion of the Court's analysis, see
infra notes 343-49 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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has persisted in the years since the Court issued these decisions.23'
After discussing the consequential confusion in the lower federal
courts, 232 this Note will attempt to clarify the Aldinger test and
describe in detail the process a court should go through to determine
if Congress has negated jurisdiction. 233
Ill. The Current Dispute
Because of the lack of guidance afforded by Aldinger and Owen, 2 1
the federal courts have continued to develop divergent approaches
to the use of pendent party jurisdiction in section 1983 cases. 235
Thus, pendent party jurisdiction has become "embattled ' ' 2 6 and,
alternatively characterized as "nascent" 2" and "moribund," '238 con-
tinues to provoke controversy.
The various approaches taken by the lower federal courts may be
divided into two classes: (1) those courts that never reach the question
of how to apply the Aldinger test;2 ' " and (2) those courts that do
reach the test.m'
A. Courts That Fail to Reach the Aldinger Test
Most federal courts never reach the Aldinger analysis, escaping
it on the basis of a number of different rationales.24' In the Ninth
Circuit, for example, the court of appeals continues to adhere to
the position that pendent party jurisdiction is unconstitutional, and
thus holds that the doctrine is unavailable no matter what federal
statute gives rise to the federal claim. 24
2
231. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 234-81 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 282-362 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 21-23, 230-31 and accompanying text.
235. See infra notes 239-81 and accompanying text.
236. Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 187 (7th Cir. 1984).
237. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1379 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 932 (1983).
238. Padilla v. d'Avis, 580 F. Supp. 403, 410 (N.D. 111. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Jones v. City of Chicago, 787 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1986).
239. See infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 247-81 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
242. The Ninth Circuit 'maintained its absolute ban both before the Supreme
Court's Aldinger decision, see, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.
1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
1(1973); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969), and after. See, e.g., Carpenters
S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. D & L Camp Constr. Co., 738 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1984);
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982); Ayala v. United
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District courts in other circuits243 have similarly avoided the Al-
dinger analysis. Some of these courts simply assert that they will
skip over the "statutory" stage of the analysis and go directly
to the "discretionary" stage, and then dismiss the pendent party
for discretionary reasons.2" Other courts merely cite to the precedent
States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
Despite the frequent invocation of this rule, the district courts of the Circuit
have occasionally broken it. See, e.g., Potter v. Rain Brook Feed Co., 530 F.
Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (court of appeals "has yet to articulate its
constitutional objections to pendent party theory" and neither "that court nor the
Supreme Court [has] identified a precedential or doctrinal basis upon which to
distinguish pendent claim from pendent party claim jurisdiction on constitutional
grounds"); Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Ariz. 1973).
Moreover, in the case of Traver v. Mehsriy, 627 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1980),
even the court of appeals, though without acknowledging it, permitted the use of
pendent party jurisdiction. The dispute in Traver arose out of a misunderstanding
in a bank between the plaintiff, a bank customer attempting to make a withdrawal,
and one of the defendants, a bank operations officer named Meshriy. 627 F.2d
at 937. When the plaintiff attempted to storm out of the bank, Meshriy alerted
the bank's security guard, an off-duty police officer named Gibson. Id. Gibson,
his gun drawn, blocked the plaintiff's exit, and held him for approximately half
an hour. Id. Under § 1983, the plaintiff sued Gibson (a state actor) directly, and
the bank, on a theory of vicarious liability. Id. at 936, 938. In addition, the
plaintiff sued Gibson, the bank and Meshriy under state tort law, asserting that
pendent jurisdiction supported these nonfederal claims. Id. at 938. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to dismiss the pendent claims, id. at
939, and held that the jury had based its verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the
state-law claims alone. Id.
Although the court of appeals never mentioned pendent party jurisdiction, it in
fact allowed the use of it by affirming the exercise of jurisdiction over Meshriy.
It is true that the claim against the bank was an ordinary pendent claim, because
the plaintiff had asserted a federal § 1983 claim against the bank, which was
"tenuous, but not frivolous," id. at 939, and therefore sufficient to support a
pendent claim. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. With regard to Meshriy,
however, there was no § 1983 claim at all. See 627 F.2d at 939. Thus, by affirming
the exercise of jurisdiction over Meshriy, the court was in effect permitting the
use of pendent party jurisdiction. See Moore, 754 F.2d at 1360 (Posner, J., separate
opinion) (characterizing Traver as case allowing pendent party jurisdiction).
Nevertheless, after Traver, the court of appeals and many district courts have
continued to assert that the circuit maintains its absolute ban on the doctrine. See,
e.g., Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. D & L Camp Constr. Co., 738 F.2d
999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1984); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 555
(9th Cir. 1982); Munoz v. Small Business Admin., 644 F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (9th
Cir. 1981); Nunnelley v. County of Douglas, 622 F. Supp. 124, 126 (D. Nev.
1985); Langford v. Gates, 610 F. Supp. 120, 122 n.l (C.D. Cal. 1985); Miletich
v. Raley's, 593 F. Supp. 124, 125 (D. Nev. 1984).
243. The other circuits either: (1) have expressly allowed for pendent party jur-
isdiction in a § 1983 case, see infra notes 264-81 and accompanying text; or (2)
have not, since Aldinger, ruled on the issue of whether pendent party jurisdiction
is available in a § 1983 claim. See infra note 247.
244. See, e.g., Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985); Williams
v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1379-80 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932
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of another lower federal court and, without offering any rationale
for following a non-binding decision, choose to rule in the same
way. 245 Still others, asserting that the doctrine is disfavored and that
the courts should therefore use it sparingly, dismiss pendent claims
for "policy" reasons. 246
B. Courts That Do Reach the Aldinger Test
A smaller group of courts reaches the Aldinger test.247 These courts
may be further subdivided into: (1) those courts that apply the test
in such a way that they will invariably dismiss the pendent party; 248
and (2) those courts that undergo a full process of statutory con-
struction .249
The first class of courts holds that the Aldinger test is simply a
form of the canon of statutory construction known as expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.250 In its simplest form, this "much
(1983); Hall v. Board of Educ., No. 85-C-6544, slip op. (N.D. I11. Aug. 19, 1985)
(available Jan. 13, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Pitt v. City of New
York, No. 82 Civ. 3349, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1984) (available Jan. 11, 1986,
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Padilla v. d'Avis, 580 F. Supp. 403, 410
(N.D. I11. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. City of Chicago, 787 F.2d 200 (7th Cir.
1986); Red Elk v. Vig, 571 F. Supp. 422, 426 n.6 (D.S.D. 1983).
245. See, e.g., Onesti v. Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1262,
1264 (N.D. 111. 1985); Arancibia v. Berry, 603 F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Becerra v. United States, No. L-83-11, slip op. (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 1984) (available
Jan. 13, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
246. See, e.g., Savas v. Sheehan, No. 86-C-1531, slip op. (N.D. 111. Jun. 10,
1986) (available Sept. 18, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). One court,
after finding that Congress had been completely silent in the statute on the issue
of pendent party claims, simply appraised the case "in the light of [the historical]
... development" of pendent party jurisdiction. See Fritts v. Niehouse, 604 F. Supp.
823, 828 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1985).
247. This class of courts includes the few circuit courts that have held that pen-
dent party jurisdiction is at last theoretically available in a § 1983 case, i.e., (1)
the Seventh Circuit, see infra notes 264-79 and accompanying text; (2) the Eleventh
Circuit, see infra note 281; and (3) possibly the Fifth Circuit, see infra note 280,
as well as the circuits that have not had an opportunity since Aldinger to decide
a § 1983 case involving pendent party jurisdiction. These circuits are the First, Se-
cond, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth and the District of Columbia Circuit.
248. For a discussion of courts that apply the Aldinger test in this way, see
infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
249. For a discussion of courts that engage in a full analysis, see infra notes
261-81 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Szumny v. Village of Addison, No. 85-C-5149, slip op. (N.D.
I1l. Oct. ,9, 1985) (available Jan. 11, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Stephenson v. Esquivel, 614 F. Supp. 986, 994 (D.N.M. 1985); Bright v. City of
New York, No. 83 Civ. 7775-CSH, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1985) (available
Jan. 11, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file); Neilan v. Value Vacations,
Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1227, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Bostedt v. Festivals, Inc., 569 F.
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maligned ' 251 canon permits the inference that the mere inclusion of
certain categories by the legislative body indicates legislative intent
to exclude all other categories. 2 2 Thus, the canon allows a court to
draw an inference about congressional intent from what is essentially
congressional silence. 253
The courts applying the canon in the context of pendent party
jurisdiction read Aldinger to hold that whenever Congress has not
explicitly included a party within a jurisdiction-granting statute, it
has necessarily negated jurisdiction over that party by implication. 254
Of course, in pendent party jurisdiction cases, the plaintiff will
almost invariably be seeking to join a party over whom Congress
has failed to confer express jurisdiction. 25 It follows that these courts,
Supp. 503, 506-07 (N.D. 11. 1983); McArthur v. Robinson, 568 F. Supp. 393, 397
(E.D. Ark. 1983). Several commentators have also read Aldinger to impose an
expressio unius test. See, e.g., Comment, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the
Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 938 (1979); Capra,
supra note 13, at 23, col. 3. For a definition of the canon, see infra note 252.
251. Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless
National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L. J. 611, 637 n.136; see also F. DICKERSON,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATuTES 234 ("[fjar from being a rule,
it is not even lexicographically accurate") [hereinafter cited as DICKERSON]; K.
LLEWELLYN, Tm COMMON LAW TADITION 521-35 (1960) (for every canon there is
equal and opposite canon); Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and
in the Court, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 800, 805-17 (1983) (Court's use of expressio unius
canon may show that "judicial use of the canons ... is hopelessly opportunistic");
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 874-75 (1930) ("first
comment on the rule is that it is not true"); Sinclair, Law and Language: The
Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PrrT. L. REV. 373, 415 (1985)
(expressio unius "has generated the most hostile antipathy among some commen-
tators"); Sneed, The Art of Statutory Construction, 62 TEX. L. REV. 665, 682-83
n.82 (1983) (canons viewed with "disfavor, if not derision").
252. The canon has been defined as the "maxim of statutory interpretation
meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another .... Under
this maxim, if [a) statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to
specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
253. Cf. Foy, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Rights
of Action in the Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 521 & n.62 (1986)
(stating that inference from legislative "silence" is "an application of the principle
expressio unius"). A proponent of the expressio unius approach might argue
that the canon does not allow an inference from "silence," but rather from Congress'
act of failing to include something. The Court, however, and several commentators
have characterized this act of "failing to include" as silence. See id.; Murphy,
Sidetracking -the FELA: The Railroads' Property Damage Claims, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 366-67 (1985); see also infra note 302.
254. See supra note 251.
255. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 23 (Brennan, J., dissenting) As Justice Brennan
expressed it, the test could be viewed as "meaningless," since it could be "capable
of application to all cases, because all instances of asserted pendent-party jurisdiction
will by definition involve a party as to whom Congress has impliedly 'addressed
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unless they provide for exceptions, can almost never exercise pendent
party jurisdiction. Moreover, by applying an expressio unius test,
these courts are disregarding not only the fact that the canon has
long been held in disfavor,5 6 but also, as demonstrated below, that
the Court did not intend the lower federal courts to use such a
test.
25 7
Under a subtler version of the expressio unius test, a failure to
include a category of parties creates only a presumption that Congress
has negated jurisdiction. 258 This "presumption" form of the canon
allows for a theoretical possibility of pendent party jurisdiction; 25 9
however, as shown below, this form of the expressio unius test also
diverges from the Court's intention in Aldinger and Owen. 260
Other federal courts have held that, to determine if Congress has
negated jurisdiction over a certain category of parties under Aldinger,
a court should go through a full process of statutory construction
in each case.26 ' To aid in their analysis, these courts look primarily
itself' by not expressly conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts."
Id. (emphasis in original). There is one possible exception to this rule: cases brought
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b), a statute in which Congress expressly provided for
pendent jurisdiction over any "civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition,"
when it is joined with "a substantial and related claim under copyright, patent,
plant variety protection or trademark laws." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b). The statute does
not explicitly grant jurisdiction over claims involving pendent parties, although
nothing in its language would seem to limit its scope to pendent claims. A court
using a rigid expressio unius approach could thus hold that Congress, by expressly
providing for jurisdiction over "claims," it implicitly rejected jurisdiction over
"parties." A more reasonable reading, however, would grant jurisdiction over
parties as well as claims, and thus would create a minor exception to the utter
eradication of pendent party jurisdiction that the expressio unius test would ef-
fectuate.
256. See supra note 251.
257. Cf. Potter v. Rain Brook Feed Co., 530 F. Supp. 569, 579 (E.D. Cal.
1982). In this pendent party case, brought under FELA, the court stated that
"[piroperly read, Aldinger and Kroger call for more than congressional silence
before a court can properly conclude that pendent or ancillary jurisdiction has
been expressly or impliedly foreclosed." Id.; see also infra notes 285-349 and accom-
panying text.
258. See Chas. Kurz Co. v. Lombardi, 595 F. Supp. 373, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Unravelling, supra note 13, at 930-47; Capra, supra note 13, at 23, col. 3.
259. The presumption of negation can occasionally be overcome. See Chas. Kurz
Co., 595 F. Supp. at 379-80 (implying that "indication from Congress" could
overcome presumption, and stating, without support, that "[t]he exceptional cases
where the presumption may be overcome will .primarily involve those situations in
which the proposed pendent party is necessary or indispensable to the resolution
of a valid pendent claim"); Capra, supra note 13, at 23, col. 3 (presumption
overcome if "Congress has expressed some affirmative intent to include non-federal
parties on a pendent-party basis").
260. See infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 n.5 (llth
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at the legislative history, 262 and generally allow jurisdiction if they
find Congress has been silent.26 3
On the circuit court level, a trend may have started toward a
more liberal use of pendent party jurisdiction in section 1983 ac-
tions.2" The Seventh Circuit, for example, was originally inhospitable
to the doctrine, not only in section 1983 cases, but generally. 265 Even
before Aldinger, its courts were unwilling to exercise pendent party
jurisdiction. 26 After Aldinger, they became even less willing, often
expressing a perception that the Supreme Court was hostile to the
doctrine and would soon reject it completely, 267 and noting that the
Seventh Circuit in particular regarded pendent party jurisdiction with
disfavor. 2"
Cir. 1985); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 1985);
Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1359-61 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Posner, J., separate opinion); Barnes v. Hinsdale Hosp., No. 85-C-4268, slip op.(N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1985) (available Jan. 13, 1986 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Irwin v. Calhoun, 522 F. Supp. 576, 581-82 (D. Mass. 1981); cf. Potter v.
Rain Brook Feed Co., 530 F. Supp. 569, 579 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (FELA case).
262. See, e.g., Moore, 754 F.2d at 1359-61; Irwin v. Calhoun, 522 F. Supp.
576, 581 (D. Mass. 1981).
263. See, e.g., Moore, 754 F.2d at 1359, Calhoun, 522 F. Supp. at 580; cf.
Potter, 530 F. Supp. at 579.
264. See infra notes 265-81 and accompanying text.
265. See infra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Wojtas v. City of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); Drennan v. City of Lake Forest, 356 F. Supp.
1277 (N.D. 111. 1972).
267. See, e.g., Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 487 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[although
pendent party jurisdiction is not dead ... neither is it in the best of health"); Bern-
stein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 187 (7th Cir. 1984) (questioning whether
pendent party jurisdiction "retains any vitality" and calling it an "embattled con-
cept"); Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 697 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting
"current judicial hostility"); Knudsen v. D.C.B., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (N.D.
Ill. 1984) (doctrine "has never been expressly approved of" by Court "and in fact
was negatively referred to in Aldinger"); Bostedt v. Festivals, Inc., 569 F. Supp.
503, 505 (N.D. 111. 1983) (asserting Court "has never expressly approved of" doc-
trine and that "opposite likely is true").
268. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1982) (questioning
whether "anything survives of pendent party jurisdiction in this Circuit"); Knudsen,
592 F. Supp. at 1235 (doctrine has "generally met with disfavor in this Circuit"
and "with certain ... exceptions, there is no pendent party jurisdiction in this
Circuit"); Harris v. Beynon, 570 F. Supp. 690, 692 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (may be "no
room at all" for pendent party jurisdiction "in this Circuit under any circum-
stances"); Martin v. County of Kendall, 561 F. Supp. 726, 730 (N.D. 111. 1983)
("our Court of Appeals has all but closed the door on pendent party jurisdiction
as a whole"); Ragusa v. City of Streator, 95 F.R.D. 527, 529 (N.D. 111. 1982)
(court of appeals has "made its point of view on the undesirability" of pendent
party jurisdiction "very plain indeed").
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In Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc.,269 however, the Seventh
Circuit extended tentative recognition to pendent party jurisdiction
in a section 1983 case.270 In Moore, after a dispute between the
plaintiffs and the owner of the Marketplace Restaurant led to the
plaintiffs' wrongful arrest, the plaintiffs brought section 1983 and
state-law claims against the arresting officers and the owner.27', The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claim
against the restaurant owner, but not against the arresting officers.272
The court therefore addressed the issue of whether the district court
should retain the owner as a pendent party.27 3
While admitting that "[tihe 'pendent parties' concept has ...
wobbly constitutional foundations, '27 4 Judge Posner pointed out that
in Aldinger the Court had expressly left open the question of "whether
the concept retains vitality."' 27 Asserting that he could not see "why,
once an overbroad reading of Aldinger ... is rejected, pendent
party jurisdiction, if available in other federal-question cases, should
not be available in a section 1983 case," '276 Judge Posner held for
the court277 that the district court could take jurisdiction of the
pendent party claim against the owner. 271
Thus, Moore may indicate a Seventh Circuit trend towards more
liberal use of pendent party jurisdiction, at least in cases in which
the party to be joined is not a municipality."' The Fifth2" and
269. 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985).
270. Id. at 1359-61.
271. Id. at 1339.
272. Id. at 1339-40, 1353, 1356, 1361.
273. See id. at 1353-54, 1359-61.
274. Id. at 1359.
275. Id. at 1360.
276. Id. at 1360-61.
277. Although Judge Coffey, who wrote the opinion of the court on the other
issues in Moore, believed that pendent party jurisdiction was not permissible on
the facts, see 754 F.2d at 1352-54, Judges Posner and Gibson agreed that it was
permissible. See id. at 1359-61. Thus, Judge Posner's opinion, holding pendent
party jurisdiction permissible in a section 1983 case, is the decision of the court.
See Savas v. Sheehan, No. 86-C-1531, slip op. (N.D. Il. Jun. 10, 1986) (available
Sept. 19, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
278. Moore, 754 F.2d at 1359.
279. See id. at 1360-61.
280. In Finch v. Mississippi State Medical Ass'n, 585 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978),
the Fifth Circuit had stated flatly that Aldinger completely precludes "federal
jurisdiction over pendent parties in a § 1983 suit." Id. at 780 (emphasis in original).
In a recent § 1983 case, however, the court of appeals stated in a footnote that
on remand the district court would "not be foreclosed from considering" the doc-
trine of pendent party jurisdiction. See Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1165 n.3(5th Cir. 1986). Yet the court failed to offer any analysis or to overrule Finch ex-
plicitly. See id. Although one district court from the Tenth Circuit has followed
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Eleventh2"' Circuits may be experiencing similar trends.
IV. Determining When Congress Has Negated Jurisdiction
As is demonstrated below, Aldinger and Owen show that the Court
did not intend the lower federal courts to use the expressio unius test
in either its simple28 2 or presumption 28 1 forms, but rather intended
them to use an in-depth process of statutory construction.28 4 This
process entails: (1) construing the language of the statute in question
in an attempt to ascertain if there is any affirmative evidence (beyond
a mere "failure to include") of actual congressional intent to negate
jurisdiction; 85 (2) employing a wide range of extrinsic aids to con-
struction; 28 6 and (3) using a case-by-case approach. 27 Each element
of this approach can be derived from the language of Aldinger and
the example the Supreme Court set in its own application of the
test in both Aldinger and Owen. 218
Finch after the Coon decision, see Steele v. Stephan, 633 F. Supp. 950 (D. Kan.
1986), research has revealed no cases since Coon in which the district courts of the
Fifth Circuit have had an opportunity to respond to Coon's footnote.
281. The Eleventh Circuit has only recently held that the doctrine is available
in a § 1983 case. In 1982, the last time the Circuit had a § 1983 case involving
pendent party jurisdiction, the court of appeals held that it "need not resolve the
issue" because the "exercise of pendent party jurisdiction is a discretionary decision
reserved to the district court," and it concluded that the district court had "acted
within Its discretion." Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1379-80 (11 th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983). The court described the doctrine as "nascent,"
see Id. at 1379, and "tenuous." See Id. at 1380. Moreover, in 1984, while allowing
pendent party jurisdiction in a Federal Tort Claims Act case, the Court "recogniz[ed]
that the Supreme Court has significantly circumscribed the power of federal courts
to exercise pendent party jurisdiction." See Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 645,
647 (lth Cir. 1984).
Then, in Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436 (lth Cir. 1985),
the court of appeals implicitly allowed the use of pendent party jurisdiction in a
§ 1983 case. See id. at 1443 n.5. The district court had dismissed the pendent party
claims solely because it had already dismissed the federal claims. See id. at 1439.
The court of appeals reversed the district court on its dismissal of the federal
claims, and remanded, instructing the lower court "to consider whether the ends
of justice and the interests of judicial economy will best be served by [the pendent
party's] continued presence in this lawsuit." Id. at 1443 n.5.
282. For a discussion of the simple form of the expressio unius test, see supra
notes 250-57 and Infra notes 289-306, 311-49 and accompanying text.
283. For a discussion of the "presumption" form of the expressio unius test,
see supra notes 258-60; infra notes 307-10 and accompanying text.
284. See infra notes 289-362 and accompanying text.
285. See infra notes 289-349 and accompanying text.
286. See infra notes 350-58 and accompanying text.
287. See infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text.
288. See infra notes 289-349 and accompanying text.
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A. The Need to Establish an Affirmative Manifestation of
Actual Congressional Intent to Negate Jurisdiction
That the Court intended the lower courts to find an affirmative
manifestation of congressional intent to negate jurisdiction, as op-
posed to using a form of the expressio unius test, may be discerned,
first of all, in the language of Aldinger.2 9 First, the Court explicitly
stated that it was not "lay[ing] down any sweeping pronouncement"
upon the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction. 290 Yet, in its simplest
form,29' an expressio unius test would require the exclusion of all
parties who are not expressly included within the scope of a statute, 292
and pendent party jurisdiction-by definition-almost always applies
only to parties who are not so expressly included. 293 Thus, if the
Aldinger test created an expressio unius test, Aldinger would essen-
tially require the exclusion of all pendent parties, and the Court
would have effectively eradicated the doctrine. 29' Furthermore, since
according to most commentators the Aldinger test also applies to
ordinary pendent claim jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction, 295 an
289. See infra notes 288-309 and accompanying text. Further support for the
proposition that the Court intended the lower courts to find an affirmative man-
ifestation of congressional intent may be found in the way the Court applied the
Aldinger test in Aldinger and Owen. See infra notes 311-49 and accompanying
text.
290. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
291. See supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
293. If the statute expressly covered a party, there would be no need to use
pendent party jurisdiction, for. the party could sue or be sued directly under the
statute. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text. It is true that Congress
may have created one exception to the rule that pendent party jurisdcition applies
only to parties that have not been expressly included in a statute: in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(b), Congress expressly granted pendent jurisdiction in intellectual property
cases, and as discussed above, see supra note 255, presumably over pendent parties
as well. In itself, this one statute does not significantly change the impact of the
expressio unius test on pendent party jurisdiction.The statute does raise the argument, however, that its very existence implies that
Congress has negated jurisdiction over pendent claims or parties in all cases that
do not involve intellectual property. In other words, if Congress expressly provided
for pendent jurisdiction in intellectual property cases, why did it not do so in other
statutes, such as § 1983? This argument is merely a broader use of the expressio
unius test, and in this broader context, the test's weaknesses are particularly
noticeable. Congress has enacted innumerable statutes long before the advent of
pendent jurisdiction. For example, it enacted § 1983 in 1871, see supra notes 82-
84 and accompanying text, while pendent party jurisdiction did not begin to develop
until after the Gibbs case, which was decided in 1966. See Supra notes 180, 198-
202 and accompanying text.
294. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 23 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bagwell, supra note
13, at 344; Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 176.
295. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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expressio unius reading of Aldinger would effectively destroy pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction as well .296 A more "sweeping pronounce-
ment" would be hard to imagine.
Further support for the conclusion that the Court did not intend
to impose an expressio unius test is found in the fact that the Court
explicitly stated that pendent party jurisdiction might be permissible
under "other statutory grants, ' 297 such as the Federal Torts Claim
Act.298 Since the expressio unius test in its standard form would
essentially exclude all pendent parties, 299 the Court could not logically
have imposed such a test and have simultaneously allowed for the
possibility of pendent party jurisdiction under another statutory
grant.
Even further support is found in the precise words with which
the Court formulated the Aldinger test. These words suggest that
the Court had in mind something more than mere silence to establish
congressional negation of jurisdiction. 3°° The test, as framed by the
Court, states that a federal court cannot exercise pendent party
jurisdiction if Congress has "expressly or by implication negated"
it.3°0 The Court could have framed the test differently, to state that
a court can exercise pendent party jurisdiction if Congress has
"expressly or by implication" validated it. The two constructions
would each create a different test: the former requires Congress to
make at least some affirmative act to negate jurisdiction; the latter
requires Congress to make an affirmative act to validate it. The
Court's choice of the former construction, then, indicates that the
Court intended the test to require something affirmative, beyond
mere silence, to establish a negation of jurisdiction.302
296. See Luneburg, supra note 21, at 244; Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at
176; Pendent Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 135, 147-52; Redish, supra note 13,
at 1396. One might argue that courts would not have to use an expressio unius test
in ancillary and pendent claim jurisdiction cases, on the ground that these doctrines
are less drastic than pendent party jurisdiction. It is true that in Aldinger Justice
Rehnquist said that "there is a more serious obstacle" to the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction if a new party is involved. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. Nevertheless, it
is hard to see how that fact would justify using an expressio unius test in pendent
party cases and another approach in ancillary and pendent claim cases. In all three
types of cases, the question is whether Congress has acted to limit federal court
jurisdiction over the claim at issue. See Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 176-78.
297. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
298. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982); see Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
299. See supra notes 287-94 and accompanying text.
300. See infra note 301-02 and accompanying text.
301. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
302. An advocate of the expressio unius approach might argue that the "failure
to include" a party is "something affirmative" and not mere silence. The Court
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In addition, the Court made several references to the kind of
analysis it intended the courts to employ. These references, especially
when considered cumulatively, indicate that the Court did not en-
vision an expressio unius test, but rather a fuller process of statutory
construction. For example, the Court said that "[rjesolution of a
claim of pendent-party jurisdiction ... calls for careful attention
to the relevant statutory language."313 Such "careful attention" would
hardly be necessary if all the federal court had to do was to determine
whether Congress had expressly included a party within the scope
of the statute. The Court made similar references to a full process
of statutory construction by stating that the statute should be "con-
strued," 3°4 that "deductions" 305 may be drawn, and that its decision
was a "fair reading" 3°6 of the statutes.
Moreover, the language in Aldinger shows that the Court intended
the lower courts to ascertain actual congressional intent, as opposed
to positing a "presumption" of negation based on congressional
silence. 7 First, nothing in the opinion supports such a use of a
presumption. Throughout Aldinger, and Owen for that matter, the
Court never once spoke in terms of "presumptions. "30 And again,
the Court's choice of words for the Aldinger test-stating that
pendent party jurisdiction is permissible unless Congress has negated
it, as opposed to stating that pendent party jurisdiction is imper-
missible unless Congress has validated it'° 9-suggests that if any pre-
sumption is to be drawn from congressional silence, it must be the
presumption that pendent party jurisdiction is permissible. 10
The way the Court employed its test, in both Aldinger and in
Owen, also suggests that the Court intended the lower federal courts
in Aldinger, however, did not view a "failure to include" in this way, and in fact
equated it with silence. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 14-16. In discussing Gibbs and
Osborn, the Court stated that Congress had been "silent" in those cases, and that
it was therefore unnecessary to address the question of congressional negation. 427
U.S. at 15-17. But the statutes at issue in Gibbs and Osborn just as surely omitted
the state-law claims sought to be appended in those cases as did the statute at
issue in Aldinger. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 20 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus,
the Court viewed "failure to include" as equivalent to "silence," and required
something more to establish congressional negation.
303. 427 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. This use of the phrase "fair reading" echoes writings on traditional
statutory construction. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 539 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter].
307. See infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
308. See Owen, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
309. See supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
310. See id.
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to engage in an in-depth analysis of the statute and to find some
affirmative manifestation of congressional intent, beyond the mere
"failure to include" a party that would suffice to satisfy an expressio
unius test. Although the Court did not put a label on the process
it was using, the two opinions indicate that the Court was em-
phatically not using any form of the expressio unius test in either
case."' The Court's analysis entails several steps,31 2 with the apparent
use of expressio unius reasoning occurring in the last step. 3
In the first step, the Court found it necessary to consider the
possibility of congressional limitation on the use of pendent party
jurisdiction, 1 4 because Congress had "addressed itself to the party"
the plaintiff sought to join.3 5 Next, the Court looked to the language
of the jurisdictional statute, section 1343, to ascertain whether Con-
gress had "wanted to grant this sort of jurisdiction to the federal
courts.1 316 The Court found that section 1343 granted jurisdiction
only over a civil action "authorized by law,"3 7 and interpreted the
word "law" as a reference to section 1983.318 Therefore, the Court
reasoned, section 1343 should be construed in light of the scope of
section 1983. 3' 9
The Court then incorporated the extensive interpretation of section
1983 found in Monroe v. Pape3 20 to establish that Congress had
excluded counties from the scope of section 1983.321 Then, because
of section 1343's reference to section 1983, the Court stated that
counties should be excluded from the scope of section 1343 as well.322
Finally, the Court reasoned that, because Congress had implicitly
excluded counties from the jurisdictional statute, the substantive'
statute should "not be so broadly read as to bring them back within
[the] power" of the federal courts, through the use of pendent party
jurisdiction. 23 Hence, the Court held, Congress had negated juris-
diction 324
311. See infra notes 312-49 and accompanying text.
312. See infra notes 314-24 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 325-28 and accompanying text.
314. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15-16.
315. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
316. Id. at 17.
317. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961).
321. 427 U.S. at 16.
322. Id. at 16-17.
323. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
324. Id. at 18-19.
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This last step may seem like an expressio unius test, since the
Court appears to be saying that whenever Congress has essentially
left a party "off the list" of the substantive statute, a court should
find that Congress intended to leave the party off the list of the
jurisdictional statute as well.3 2 The context of the entire opinion,
however, reveals that it was not the simple fact that Congress had
failed to include municipalities that led the Court to find that
Congress had negated jurisdiction.3 26 Nor did the Court base its
ultimate holding on the presumption that Congress had negated
jurisdiction.3 27 Instead, the Court looked for and found indications
that Congress actually and affirmatively opposed the inclusion of
municipalities .3 28
First, in distinguishing Aldinger from Gibbs and its predecessor,
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 29 the Court repeatedly em-
phasized that in both of those cases, Congress had been "silent"
on the question of joining state-law claims.3 '" Yet, in both Gibbs
and Osborn, Congress had in fact "failed to include" the state-law
claims within the scope of the statutes at issue.33" ' Had the Aldinger
Court been using an expressio unius test, this "failure to include"
would have meant that Congress had negated jurisdiction in those
cases.31 2 Yet the Court expressly stated that there was no such
negation in -Gibbs and Osborn.333 This statement indicates that the
Court required something more, beyond a mere "failure to include,"
to establish negation, i.e., it indicates that the Court was not using
an expressio unius test.334
Moreover, the Court expressly contrasted Aldinger with Gibbs and
Osborn,33 asserting that Aldinger "must be decided, not in the
context of congressional silence or tacit encouragement, but in quite
325. For a discussion of the two forms of the expressio unius test, see supra
notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
326. See infra notes 329-49 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 307-10 and accompanying text.
328. See infra notes 329-49 and accompanying text.
329. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). For a discussion of Osborn and its relationship
to Gibbs, see supra notes 159-93 and accompanying text.
330. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13-16.
331. See Matasar, Primer, supra note 22, at 158, 169.
332. See Capra, supra note 13, at 22, col. 3.
333. 427 U.S. at 13-16.
334. See supra notes 329-33 and accompanying text. Although it is true that
Gibbs and Owen were pendent claim cases, not pendent party cases, there does
not seem to be any logical ground to apply a different rule in pendent claim cases.
See supra note 125.
335. 427 U.S at 13-16.
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the opposite context. 33 6 This "opposite context" can only be a
reference to the evidence of congressional intent set forth in the
extensive analysis of the legislative history of section 1983 found in
Monroe v. Pape,337 since the Aldinger Court at that point cited to
the very pages in Monroe in which the Monroe Court had gone
through this analysis.338 In Monroe, the Court had concluded that,
far from merely omitting municipalities from section 1983 coverage,
Congress had been "so antagonistic" to the idea of municipal liability
in federal court, that the Court was certain that Congress could not
have included them within the purview of section 1983.139 In Aldinger,
then, the Court was aware of this "antagonism" and referred to
it specifically. Since the Court also stated that Aldinger differed from
Gibbs because Aldinger did not involve a statute in which Congress
had been silent, the Court must have considered this "antagonism"
to be an affirmative manifestation of actual congressional intent to
negate any jurisdiction over municipalities.314 Consequently, the Court
based its finding of congressional intent to negate on neither pure
silence nor a presumption about congressional intent based on that
silence. 4m In other words, the court was using neither form of the
expressio unius test, but instead based its conclusion on affirmative
evidence that Congress actually did not want municipalities in federal
court.342
Similarly, in Owen, the Court did not hold pendent party juris-
diction to be negated until it had found affirmative evidence of
congressional intent to negate it. In Owen, the Court employed a
rule of statutory construction known as the "reenactment rule. 3 43
Under this rule, a court may find that Congress has approved a
336. Id. at 15-16.
337. 365 U.S. at 187-91. The Aldinger Court relied on Monroe's analysis because
at the time of Aldinger, the Court had not yet overruled Monroe's analysis with
its decision in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
338. 427 U.S. at 16 & n.11.
339. 365 U.S. at 187-91.
340. See Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 43-44 (lst Cir. 1977) (noting that "the
[Supreme) Court ultimately based its decision on the affirmative policy against
federal court imposition of liability on political subdivisions, which policy the Court
found in the Civil Rights Act of 1871" and concluding that "Aldinger . . . read
§ 1983 and § 1343 as evidencing an intention to preclude the creation of municipal
liability for conduct that could constitute a federal constitutional violation").
341. See supra notes 335-40 and accompanying text.
342. See id.
343. Owen, 437 U.S. at 373-74. The term "reenactment rule" is derived from
Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture
into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U.L. REv. 737, 755 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Grabowl.
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judicial interpretation of a statute when Congress reenacts the statute
without amending it to overrule the judicial gloss.3" The Court had
long interpreted the diversity statute3 45 to require complete diversity
between the parties.34 Congress had reenacted the diversity statute
several times without undoing this judicial interpretation,3 47 and the
Court explicitly relied on this fact in its analysis.3 4 Thus, the Court
in Owen based its conclusion that Congress had negated jurisdiction
between nondiverse parties on an affirmative manifestation of con-
gressional opposition to such jurisdiction."
344. The canon has been described as the presumption under which "[ilf the
legislature enacts again a statute which had long continued executive construction
... it can be said that the legislature has adopted that construction." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1150-51 (5th ed. 1979). It should be noted that although several
authorities on statutory construction view a failure on the part of Congress to
amend a statute to correct a judicial interpretation as mere silence, see, e.g.,
DICKERSON, supra note 251, at 181, these commentators distinguish an affirmative
re-enactment of a statute, and consider it far more probative of congressional
intent. See id. at 182.
345. In Owen, the original basis for federal jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship.
See supra note 226 and accompanying text. The statute providing for diversity
jurisdiction is § 1332 of Title 28 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1982). For a discussion of diversity jurisdiction, see 13B WRIGHT, supra note 1,
§§ 3601-08.
346. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 373 n.13.
347. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
348. See 437 U.S. at 373.
349. See supra notes 343-48 and accompanying text. In an attempt to gain further
illumination on what type of analysis the Court intended the lower federal courts
to use, one might also consider the brief dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist
in Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1105 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
Symm, the district court had enjoined Symm, a county official in charge of voter
registration, from using a discriminatory questionnaire that violated the twenty-
sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. See 439 U.S. at 1106-07. The
jurisdictional basis was a federal statute that granted jurisdiction over cases arising
out of the twenty-sixth amendment. See id. at 1106 & n.2. The Supreme Court,
on direct appeal, summarily. affirmed. See id. at 1105. Justice Rehnquist dissented,
because he believed that the Court lacked jurisdiction over Symm. See id. at 1105.
After stating that he thought the jurisdictional statute failed to grant jurisdiction
over state officials, id. at 1107, Justice Rehnquist noted that it was "conceivable
that the District Court based its injunction against Symm on some unarticulated,
hybrid concept of pendent-party jurisdiction." Id. at 1108. Although Justice Rehn-
quist then used an approach that might look like an expressio unius test, see id.,
the framework of his analysis belies such a conclusion. Justice Rehnquist first
found that the jurisdictional statute did not cover Symm. Id. Then, as a second
step, he considered pendent party jurisdiction, under which, he said, he "must
carefully inquire" into "the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the District Court."
Id. at 1109. If Justice Rehnquist had been using an expressio unius test, he would
not have had to undergo a full second step of the analysis, or "carefully inquire"-
he would have known immediately, from his first step, that pendent party jurisdiction
was impermissible. In fact, any resemblance to the expressio unius test that the
analysis bears is most likely attributable to its author's cursory treatment of it. In
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B. The Need to Employ a Wide Range of Aids to Construction
The Court's language and example in Aldinger and Owen also
show that the Court intended the lower federal courts to consult a
broad range of materials that might show a manifestation of congres-
sional intent.350 Within this range, the Court expressly included the
jurisdiction-granting statute"' and, if the jurisdictional statute re-
ferred to it, the substantive statute.352 In addition, by its application
of the test in Aldinger and Owen, the Court indicated that many
other forms of congressional action should be included in the
analysis.353 The Court considered the legislative history of the sub-
stantive statute5 " and, to determine general congressional attitudes
towards extending jurisdiction, it considered other statutes relating
to federal jurisdiction. 3"
The Court also considered policy factors, such as judicial economy,
convenience to the plaintiff and fairness to the parties.35 6 These
factors do not immediately appear to pertain to an analysis of
congressional intent, and indeed, under Gibbs, they would fall under
the discretionary part of the analysis.357 Under traditional methods
of statutory construction, however, a court may consider such policy
factors, on the assumption that Congress would be unlikely to enact
statutes that would be uneconomical, inconvenient or unfair.358 Thus,
the Court's consideration of these factors merely indicates further
that the Court was engaging in traditional statutory construction.
any event, the Court refused to join in Justice Rehnquist's approach. See id. at
1105.
350. The range is characterized as "wide" because the Court included some
materials that most authorities on statutory interpretation would exclude, for ex-
ample, legislative history. See, e.g., DicKERSON, supra note 251, at 195-96; Grabow,
supra note 343, at 738-40; Fisher & Harbison, Trends in the Use of Extrinsic Aids
in Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 586, 587 (1950); Jackson, The Meaning
of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A. J. 535, 538
(1948); Frankfurter, supra note 306, at 543.
351. Owen, 437 U.S. at 373, 374; Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16.
352. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16-17.
353. See id. at 16-18.
354. See id. at 16 n.ll; id. at 17 n.12.
355. See id. at 17 n.12; id. at 18.
356. Owen, 437 U.S. at 376-77; Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
357. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 306, at 539 ("it is not lightly to be
presumed that Congress sought to infringe on 'very sacred rights.' This improbability
will be a factor in determining whether the language, though it should be so read if
standing alone, was used to effect such a drastic change") (footnote omitted); see
also Green, supra note 121, at 281 (trial convenience not an excuse for enlarging
jurisdiction, but such considerations may be used as aid in interpretation).
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C. The Need to Use a Case-by-Case Approach
The basis for a case-by-case approach is also found in the language
and example of the Supreme Court's decisions. In Aldinger, the
Court explicitly said that it was "unnecessary to lay down any
sweeping pronouncement upon the existence or exercise of [pendent
party] jurisdiction."35 9 Thus, by refusing to set a comprehensive rule,
either on pendent party jurisdiction or supplemental jurisdiction in
general, the Court left the lower federal courts free to use a case-
by-case approach. In addition, the Court set an example for a case-
by-case approach by confining Aldinger strictly to its facts. The
Court explicitly stated that "[o]ther statutory grants and other align-
ments of parties and claims might call for a different result.'3 6
In short, the Court's approach was to attempt, on a case-by-case
basis, to determine Congress' actual intent with respect to the use
of pendent party jurisdiction over a certain party. In making this
determination, it considered statutes, legislative history and other
manifestations of Congress' intent.3 6' Before holding that Congress
had negated jurisdiction, the Court established affirmative evidence
of that negation. 62 The lower federal courts should do the same.
V. Applying the Aldinger Test: Two Hypothetical Cases
Today, section 1983 cases involving pendent parties commonly fall
into two categories: (1) cases in which the pendent party is a private
party who did not act under color of state law;3 6' and (2) cases in
which the pendent party is a municipality and the plaintiff is at-
tempting to use the doctrine of respondeat superior.3M This Part of
359. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
360. Id.; see also Pendent Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 140.
361. See supra notes 282-357 and accompanying text.
362. See id.
363. See, e.g., Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1160, 1162, 1165 n.3 (5th Cir.
1986); Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985);
Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
932 (1983); Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1980); Fishman v. De
Meo, 590 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
364. See, e.g., Coon, 780 F.2d at 1160; Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F. Supp. 1018,
1030 (D. Mass. 1985); Nunnelley v. County of Douglas, 622 F. Supp. 124, 126
(D. Nev. 1985); Christensen v. Phelan, 607 F. Supp. 470, 471-72 (D. Colo. 1985);
Arancibia v. Berry, 603 F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Martin v. County of
Kendall, 561 F. Supp. 726, 730 n.12 (N.D. I1. 1983); McCaw v. Frame, 499 F.
Supp. 424, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1980). A third, but less common category of § 1983
cases involving pendent parties is that of cases in which a second plaintiff, us-
ually the spouse of a § 1983 plaintiff, attempts to append nonfederal claims
against the § 1983 defendant. See e.g., Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 481 (7th
Cir. 1984); Bright v. City of New York, No. 83 Civ. 7775-CSH, slip op. (S.D.N.Y.
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the Note will apply the Aldinger test to each of these types of
cases. 365
A. Private Parties
Assume that S, the person who will be the pendent party, ma-
liciously tells Deputy M to arrest Plaintiff on the basis of a fabricated
charge. 36 While on duty, Deputy M arrests Plaintiff at home without
first obtaining an arrest warrant.167 Later, the prosecutor drops the
charges, and Plaintiff decides to sue. First, Plaintiff brings a section
1983 action against Deputy M, for depriving him of his constitutional
rights while acting under color of state law.361 Plaintiff would also
like to sue S, for instigating the incident, but he knows that he
probably cannot sue S under section 1983, because in his jurisdiction
"providing false information to an arresting officer is not, by itself,
sufficient to state a claim . . . under § 1983. "369 Plaintiff therefore
decides to sue S under state tort law. Plaintiff realizes he could bring
both the section 1983 claims and the nonfederal claims in state court,370
but he believes the federal courts are superior and more receptive to
civil rights plaintiffs. 7' Plaintiff therefore brings both claims in federal
Apr. 4, 1985) (available Jan. 13, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Fritts
v. Niehouse, 604 F. Supp. 823, 824 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1170 (8th
Cir. 1985); Clark v. City of Chicago, 595 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D. I1. 1984);
Red Elk v. Vig, 571 F. Supp. 422, 425-26 (D.S.D. 1983); Waiters v. Village of
Oak Lawn, 548 F. Supp. 417, 419-20 (N.D. Ill. 1982).365. For the analysis of private parties, see infra notes 366-401 and accompanying
text. For the analysis of municipalities, see infra notes 402-27 and accompanying
text.
366. The facts for this hypothetical case are based loosely on the facts of Moore
v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985).
367. Absent exigent circumstances, an at-home arrest effectuated without a war-
rant violates the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Payton v.
City of New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
368. The two elements of a § 1983 claim are: (1) that the defendant deprived
the plaintiff of a constitutional right; and (2) that the defendant acted under color
of state law. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text. Here: (1) Deputy M
has deprived Plaintiff of his fourth amendment rights, see supra note 366 and
accompanying text; and (2) since he committed this deprivation while "on duty,"
Deputy M has acted under color of state law. See supra notes 54-58.
369. See Moore, 754 F.2d at 1352.
370. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983
claims, see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text, and as courts of general
jurisdiction, see supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text, presumably may hear
Plaintiff's nonfederal claims.
371. For a discussion of the debate over whether federal courts are superior or
more receptive than state courts, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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court, using the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction to append the
state-law claims. 72
Assuming that this case meets the "constitutional" test of United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs3 73-that is: (1) the federal claim is substantial;
(2) the federal claims arise out of a "common nucleus of operative
fact"; and (3) Plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try the two
claims together 374-the federal court must next determine whether
the claim meets the "statutory" test of Aldinger.37 In other words,
the federal court must determine whether Congress has "expressly
or by implication negated" jurisdiction over S.376
To do so, the court must try to establish what Congress' actual
intent toward parties like S would have been. 377 The court should'
look at any possible manifestation of that intent,3 71 remembering
always that it must find an affirmative manifestation of intent to
exclude such parties, not simply a failure to include them.379
The court should start with the jurisdictional statute in question-
usually section 1343 3°0-and should read that statute in conjunction
with the scope of section 1983.31 Section 1343 is completely silent
on the issue of private parties who do not themselves act under
color of state law, but who induce a state official to violate a
person's constitutional rights 2.38  Nor does the language of section
372. For a definition and discussion of pendent party jurisdiction, see supra
notes 11, 194-233 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
376. See id.
377. See supra notes 307-10 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 350-58 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 289-349 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. As an alternative to § 1343,
some plaintiffs have used § 1331 of Title 28 of the United State Code, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982), as the jurisdictional basis for their § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Irwin
v. Calhoun, 522 F. Supp. 576 (D. Mass. 1981).
381. See supra notes 316-19 and accompanying text.
382. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 23-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because § 1343
speaks of "deprivations" rather than potential defendants, one might argue that
it permits jurisdiction over "any" civil action authorized by law-which would
include state tort actions when such a tort action was commenced to "redress" a
deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, even if the tortfeasor
was not the person who was acting under color of state law.
Such a reading, however, is at odds with the Supreme Court's reading of this
language in Aldinger. See supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text. The Court
there said that the "any civil action authorized by law" language was a reference
to § 1983 in particular, and that it meant that § 1343 must be read in conjunction
with § 1983. See id. The sentence structure of § 1983 is different from that of
§ 1343, and precludes the interpretation just offered. Section 1983 refers, not to the
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1983, aside from mere failure to include such parties, reveal any
congressional intent to negate jurisdiction over such parties.3"3 Since
a mere failure to include a party is not sufficient to manifest
congressional intent to negate jurisdiction,3 84 the language of section
1983 fails to establish negation.
A federal court should therefore consider other sources of congres-
sional intent.385 It could next consider the legislative history to section
1983's predecessor, section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,386
and the legislative history of other sections of the Act-in particular
section two, 8 ' which made a conspiracy to deprive a person of con-
stitutional rights a crime.3 8 In all these debates, however, Congress
failed to show any "antagonism" toward the idea of federal suits
against private parties who, without actually conspiring, induce state
officials to deprive a person of constitutional rights.389 It is true
"deprivation," but specifically to the defendant: "Every person who, under color
of [state law) subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
of [constitutional] rights, . . . shall be liable .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)
(emphasis added). By thus referring directly to the type of defendant who may be
sued, this language prevents one from reading § 1343 as a manifestation of
congressional intent to allow jurisdiction over state tort law actions used to redress
violations of § 1983.
But this language merely prevents one from establishing affirmative evidence that
Congress intended to allow actions against private parties-it does not, as required,
see supra notes 283-349 and accompanying text, manifest affirmative intent to negate
jurisdiction over such actions. The language of the two statutes is thus effectively
neutral.
383. Similarly, the language of § 1983 itself merely states that a person who
does act under color of state law "shall be liable." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
It is silent about persons who do not act under color of law when committing the
deprivation.
384. See supra notes 283-349 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 350-58 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 82-83, 353-54 and acconpanying text.
387. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (1982)). In Aldinger, the Supreme Court considered the legislative history
of the Sherman amendment, see supra notes 92-107, 337-42 and accompanying text,
which was not actually legislative history to § 1983. Section 1983 derives from only
section one of the Civil Rights Act. The Sherman amendment, on the other hand,
was to be added as a separate section to the Civil Rights Act. See Monell, 436 U.S.
at 665-66. Because the Aldinger test itself provides little guidance to the lower federal
courts, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text, this Note has considered the
Supreme Court's application of its test as evidence of the process the Court intended
the federal courts to use. See supra notes 312-49 and accompanying text.
388. See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 21, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982)). Section 1985 requires a conspiracy between
at least two actors. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982).
389. In Aldinger, the Court had found congressional "antagonism" toward the
notion of suing municipalities in federal court. See supra notes 335-42 and ac-
companying text. In the debates on section two, however, there was no such
antagonism. See infra note 391.
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that the forty-second Congress enacted statutes that contained par-
ticular limitations, and that the legislative history contains discussions
that support these limitations. 319 It would be unjustified, however,
to conclude from these discussions that Congress was antagonistic
toward the idea of any federal court action against a person who
failed to meet the requirements of the statutes, even when there is
a separate basis of jurisdiction, such as pendent party jurisdiction.
to the contrary, the debates on sections one and two show, if
anything, that the proponents of the bills were in reality deeply
committed to the goal of halting the private actions of the Ku Klux
Klan, and refrained from enacting a statute directly addressing this
private conduct only because of constitutional constraints.39' More-
over, in the debates, members of Congress repeatedly stressed that
section one was remedial, and therefore the constitutional provisions
authorizing it should be "liberally and beneficently construed."3 92
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the proponents of sections
one and two, far from being antagonistic to the idea, would have
welcomed a jurisdictional doctrine that allowed a federal court to hear
claims against private parties.
A federal court can also consider policy factors.3 93 In this con-
nection the federal court could note that as a policy matter, the
courts have historically been less concerned with suits in federal
court against ordinary citizens than against municipalities and other
forms of government. 319 Another set of policy factors a court might
consider is convenience and judicial economy.3 95 Here, it would be
particularly convenient and economical to try the claims against S
and Deputy M together, because, far more than simply being related
by a common nucleus of operative fact, 31 the two claims will both
involve an examination of S's and Deputy M's actions, motivations
and interaction on the night of Plaintiff's arrest, and will therefore
390. These limitations are the under color of state law requirement contained in
§ 1983, see supra notes 54-58, and the requirement of a conspiracy between two
people contained in § 1985. See supra note 388.
391. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 444 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Butler), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 86, at 530-31.
392. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 85, at 493.
393. See supra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
394. See Moore, 754 F.2d at 1359. For a discussion of the Court's concern with
subjecting municipalities to federal court suits, see supra notes 92-107 and accom-
panying text.
395. See supra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
396. By definition, all pendent party claims must arise out of the same nucleus
of operative fact as the federal claim. See supra notes 184-93 and accompanying
text.
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most likely entail introducing the same witnesses and evidence. Al-
though Plaintiff could bring both claims in state court and achieve
the same economy,3 97 forcing Plaintiff into state court would thwart
congressional intent to provide a federal forum for section 1983
plaintiffs, 398 as well as disserving the congressional interest in having
federal courts interpret federal law, and giving plaintiffs an unre-
stricted choice of forum.39
In sum, the evidence of congressional intent, if anything, supports
the inference that Congress would have allowed federal courts to
exercise pendent party jurisdiction over private individuals and cor-
porations that did not act under color of state law, but induced a
state official to violate a person's constitutional rights.4 Since no
evidence shows that Congress affirmatively intended to negate federal
jurisdiction over such private parties, the federal court should find
pendent party jurisdiction permissible. 0 1
B. Municipalities
Now assume that all the facts from the preceding hypothetical
case'0 are the same, except that Plaintiff decides to sue, not S, but
Deputy M's employer, the County.
Plaintiff knows that Deputy M was not acting pursuant to a
"custom" or "policy" established by the County, and therefore
realizes that he cannot sue the County directly under section 1983.4 01
Again, Plaintiff decides to use pendent party jurisdiction, by bringing
a state-law respondeat superior claim against the County, and ap-
pending it to the section 1983 claim against Deputy M.4 Assume
again that Plaintiff can satisfy the three prongs of the "constitu-
tional" test of Gibbs.40 5
397. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 121. It is true that the congressional interests in providing
a federal forum to § 1983 plaintiffs and having federal courts interpret federal law
were implicated in Aldinger itself, and that the Supreme Court, while it did not
discuss these interests, presumably found them insufficient to overcome other in-
dications of congressional intent to negate jurisdiction in that case. Nevertheless,
since Aldinger calls for a case-by-case approach, and because in a different factual
setting such other indications may be weaker or absent, a court should consider
these congressional interests as part of the analysis.
400. See supra notes 380-99 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 289-349 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 366-72 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
404. For a discussion of how pendent party jurisdiction functions, see supra
notes 11, 194-225 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
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Most federal courts would automatically dismiss the state-law claim
against the County. They would rule that Aldinger held that
pendent party jurisdiction can never be used against a municipality
in a section 1983 case when the theory of liability is respondeat
superior. 407 These courts reason that, although in Monell the Court
overruled the underlying premise of Aldinger, and now holds that
municipalities are persons, it nevertheless maintains that municipalities
cannot be sued under the doctrine of respondeat superior.' 0' Moreover,
the Supreme Court has explicitly said that even after Monell, Aldinger's
requirement that a federal court examine congressional intent is still
good law.'"" Thus, since the Court, in Monell, found evidence of con-
gressional intent to negate jurisdiction when the pendent party is a
municipality and the plaintiff is using respondeat superior,40 a federal
court can never use pendent party jurisdiction when the party to be
appended is a municipality sued under respondeat superior."' In short,
according to this view, the combination of Aldinger and Monell com-
pels a federal court to dismiss the claim automatically, without analyz-
ing congressional intent.
In answer to this argument, one could contend that the combination
of Monell and Aldinger simply does not have the same impact on
municipalities sued under respondeat superior that Monroe v. Pape
and Aldinger had on all municipalities before the Court overruled
Monroe's premise that municipalities were not "persons." 412 Monell
now stands in the place of Monroe: it states only that Congress did
not include municipalities within the purview of section 1983 when
a plaintiff sues them under respondeat superior. 413 But there has
been no Supreme Court decision to stand in the place of Aldinger,
i.e., a decision that holds that the legislative history discussed in
Monell also shows Congress' affirmative intent to exclude such
municipalities from federal court jurisdiction entirely. Since Aldinger
calls for a case-by-case analysis of congressional intent,4" a federal
court should arguably reexamine congressional intent with respect
406. See supra note 81.
407. See, e.g., Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978); Szumny v. Village of Addison, No. 85-C-5149, slip
op. (N.D. Ill. 1985) (available Jan. 11, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
McCaw v. Frame, 499 F. Supp. 424, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
408. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
409. See Owen, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n.12.
410. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
411. See, e.g., McCaw, 499 F. Supp. at 426.
412. See infra notes 413-15 and accompanying text.
413. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95.
414. See supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text.
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to the particular facts of each case. It is true that combined impact
of Aldinger and Monell leave the federal courts little room to
adopt such a position, and that the two decisions signify that the
Court would be likely to hold against any plaintiff who raised such
an argument. Nevertheless, unless or until the Court makes such a
ruling, the lower courts can analyze the evidence of congressional
intent regarding respondeat superior claims against municipalities to
see if this evidence also amounts to an affirmative manifestation of
congressional intent to negate pendent party jurisdiction. 415
If a federal court engaged in such an analysis, moreover, it would
not be a foregone conclusion that it would find that the evidence
amounts to congressional negation, since a number of authorities
have found, with some justification, the Court's reasoning in Monell
to be unpersuasive.3 6 In Monell, the Court focused on the language
in section 1983 that made liable only a "person" who "shall subject,
or cause to be subjected," any person to the deprivation of con-
stitutional rights.4 7 This choice of words, the Court said, indicated
that Congress only wanted to hold liable those people who actually
caused a deprivation; the fact that Congress, with the phrase "or
cause to be subjected," specifically provided "that A's tort became
B's liability if B 'caused' A to subject another to a tort suggest[ed]
that Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such
causation was absent." '418
The phrase "or cause to be subjected," however, could equally
suggest that Congress was trying to convey its lack of concern with
a direct causal connection, by explicitly including one type of indirect
causation. Furthermore, under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
an employer is held to have "caused" the tort: in the nineteenth
century, the doctrine was in part based on the notion that "he who
acts through another, acts himself. ' 4 9
The Monell Court's second basis for its holding that Congress
did not intend to impose respondeat superior liability upon munic-
ipalities was Congress' rejection of the Sherman amendment. 40 The
415. See supra notes 289-362 and accompanying text.
416. See, e.g., I ANTIEAU, supra note 50, § 94, at 174 (no "adequate justification
in ... legislative history ... for excusing local governments for the civil right[s]
deprivations of the employees they have chosen, tested, trained and controlled");
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, supra note 74, at 970 ("by relying on the rejection
of the Sherman amendment," Supreme Court "simply repeated the mistake for
which it rightly condemned the decision in Monroe v. Pape").
417. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92.
418. Id. at 692.
419. See Section 1983 Municipal Liability, supra note 74, at 940.
420. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57, 693-94.
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Court's reasoning is equally unpersuasive here.42' The Sherman
amendment would have imposed liability on a municipality for any
deprivation that occurred within its borders. 422 Section 1983, in
marked contrast, imposes liability only when the defendant can be
held, at least by way of legal fiction, to have "caused" the dep-
rivation.423 Thus, it is theoretically possible that a federal court could
find that neither the language nor legislative history of section 1983
contains manifestations of affirmative congressional intent to negate
pendent party jurisdiction over a respondeat superior claim against
a particular municipality. 424
It is undeniable that the case for permitting a respondeat superior
claim against the County is quite tenuous, especially when compared
to the case for permitting a claim against the private party, discussed
above. 425 Nevertheless, since a federal court must go through the
Aldinger analysis on a case-by-case basis,426 it is possible that in
some cases a federal court would find that Congress would have
granted it jurisdiction over a particular municipality. 427
VI. Conclusion
In their current practice, most federal courts have diverged from
the original test for determining when Congress has negated jurisdic-
tion as formulated and applied by the Supreme Court in Aldinger
and Owen. Most courts fail even to reach the test and the question
of how to apply it. Among those courts that do reach the test, most,
by using the expressio unius canon, interpret it in a manner so restric-
tive that they effectively eliminate pendent party jurisdiction. But,
as Justice Frankfurter once wrote, the canons of statutory construc-
tion cannot save the courts from the "anguish of judgment" inherent
in the process of statutory construction.' 8 He wrote that "[s]uch
canons give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in
fact a delicate judgment, concluding a complicated process of balan-
cing subtle and elusive elements."'' It is this process that the courts
must embrace.
Janet E. Schomer
421. See Section 1983 Municipal Liability, supra note 74, at 942-47.
422. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
423. See Section 1983 Municipal Liability, supra note 74, at 943.
424. See supra notes 413-24 and accompanying text.
425. For an analysis of whether courts should use pendent party jurisdiction over
a private party, see supra notes 366-402 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 413-16 and accompanying text.
428. See Frankfurter, supra note 306, at 544.
429. Id.
